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The purpose of this research project is to examine the
relationship of Department of Defense Instruction 7220. 29-H
and stabilized rates upon the operations of Anniston Army-
Depot in Anniston, Alabama.
The analysis in this study is based upon interviews and
information received during a personal visit to Anniston Army
Depot, telephone interviews with personnel in Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C., and the analysis of cost
data obtained from Anniston Army Depot and the Defense Man-
power Data Center for the fiscal years 1981-1984.
The results of this study indicate that the implementa-
tion of DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H and stabilized rates have
achieved their primary objectives although there are limita-
tions that a decision maker should be aware of when inter-
preting data generated by the system. Not only must decision
makers be aware of the underlying assumptions, the data have
been found to be of limited value for decision making pur-
poses. Stabilized rates do reflect a price that will be
charged customers for work performed, however, the prices
charged are not intended to represent actual costs.
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The purpose of this research project is to examine the
relationship between Department of Defense Instruction
7220. 29-H and "stabilized rates" used by the Anniston Army
Depot in Anniston, Alabama. In particular, this study
attempts to compare the two systems, identify financial
anomolies and point out limitations that must be observed
when interpreting the data generated by these two systems.
This study is a part of a much larger research effort spon-
sored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Other thesis projects have explored how well the Uniform Cost
Accounting system captures the physical activities within a
depot, the cost accumulation process within a depot, the
effects upon cost reporting due to interservice double-
counting and how the depots transmit Uniform Cost Accounting
data to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
B. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
The Department of Defense (DoD) has strived since 1963 to
establish cost accounting and reporting systems that v/ere
uniform throughout the maintenance depots in the Department
of Defense. A uniform cost accounting and reporting system
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was desireable for two primary reasons: (1) existing ac-
counting practices and procedures varied both between the
Military Services and among the depots of the same service,
and (2) the cumulative cost data associated with the repair,
overhaul, and maintenance of Department of Defense weapons
systems were not meaningful. The solution to these problems
became known as Department of Defense Instruction 7220. 29-H,
"Guidance for Cost Accounting and Reporting for Depot Main-
tenance and Maintenance Support Cost Accounting and Produc-
tion Handbook." The target implementation date was October
1, 1976.
Stabilized rates are actually a variety of costing rates
that the depots use for the billing of work performed. Es-
tablished in FY77, stabilized rates were implemented to pro-
tect the customers of the depots budgeted production quotas
during a time when inflation was causing rapidly escalating
maintenance repair bills.
Given these tv/o sets of accounting systems, this thesis
compares the systems with each other, with accounting theory
and with the actual cost accounting system used by Anniston
Army Depot. The remainder of the thesis is divided into four
chapters. Chapter II presents an orcanizatiCnal and func-
tional view of the Army's maintenance system. Within that
context, the capabilities, facilities, and mission of Annis-
ton Army Depot are examined to determine how Anniston fits
into the overall Army maintenance picture. The histories and
13
missions of the major organizations are also presented. The
major organizations are: (1) the Army Materiel Command, (2)
Depot Systems Command, and (3) Anniston Army Depot. Chapter
III addresses DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H, the Uniform Cost
Accounting system and the development, validation, and revi-
sion of stabilized rates. Chapter IV presents the cost accu-
mulation process practiced at Anniston and the method for
data transmission into DoD 7220. 29-H format. The chapter
also compares cost data covering four years obtained from
Anniston Army Depot and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DoD
7220. 29-H generated data). Chapter V, the last chapter, com-
pares Uniform Cost Accounting, stabilized rates and actual
costs from the perspective of a management control system,
and presents conclusions and recommendations for further
study.
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II. DEPOT MAINTENANCE IN THE ARMY
Chapter II describes the Army's depot level maintenance
structure from an organizational perspective, discusses how
depot workloading is controlled and assigned, and how Anni-
ston Army Depot fits into the overall Army maintenance pro-
gram. This is accomplished by addressing the organizational
histories, missions, and responsibilities of the primary par-
ticipants in Army maintenance. For the purposes of this
research effort, those participants are: (1) Army Materiel
Command (AMC), (2) Depot Systems Command (DESCOM), and (3)
Anniston Army Depot. (Some may know AMC as the Army Materiel
Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM), however, as is
explained later, that designation is no longer correct.)
A. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
Jurisdiction over the Department of the Army's depot
level maintenance activities has been delegated to the U.S.
Army Materiel Command (AMC). (AMC-R, 1985) This command
functions through major subordinate commands and directs the
activities of depots, laboratories, arsenals, maintenance
shops, proving grounds, test ranges, and procurement offices
throughout the United States and overseas. Consequently,
overall Army maintenance policy is promulgated by AMC. While
the major subordinate commands are individually designated as
15
program managers for the Army's weapon system program, they
also serve as mid-level managers for AMC for maintenance re-
lated issues. The depots perform the maintenance and supply
functions that constitute the core of the Army Materiel Plan
(AMP). (DARCOM-R, 1982)
1 . History of the Army Materiel Command
In February of 1962, the Secretary of Defense, Robert
S. McNamara approved a plan for the reorganization of the De-
partment of the Army that established the U.S. Army Materiel
Command. The purpose of the new organization was the cen-
tralization and standardization of continental U.S. ( CONUS
)
material and logistics functions in order to improve effi-
ciency and economy. (AMC-R, 1985) AMC was established as a
major Army command with responsibilities for the life-cycle
management of Army material. After organizational changes
during the interim, AMC was redesignated the U.S. Army Mate-
riel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM). This action
was in response to the "new way of doing business" (DARCOM-R,
1982). With the control of daily operations now decentral-
ized, headquarters were designed to concentrate planning,
policy formulation, resource allocation, and evaluation. To
provide a focal point under the new system for command and
control of the Army depots and depot activities, the U.S.
Army Major Item Data Agency at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania,
was redesignated the U.S. Army Depot System Command (DESCOM)
in September of 1976. Another major realignment of DARCOM
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occurred in October of 1981 with the purpose of re-establish-
ing technical expertise, improving integration and balance
among appropriations*, and improving interface within AMC and
its subordinates. The central concept was a matrix manage-
ment approach to weapons system staff management. Under the
command of General Thompson, DARCOM was redesignated the U.S.
Army Materiel Command (AMC) in August of 1984 ( Sollenberger
,
1985). (AMC-R, 1985)
2 . Mission of the Army Materiel Command
As currently stated, the mission of AMC is: to pro-
vide broad policy and basic guidance, to accomplish major
planning, to establish and coordinate major programs, to
evaluate AMC programs and operations, to allocate resources
for mission accomplishment, to assist major subordinate com-
mands in the accomplishment of their mission, and to resolve
command-level problems. (AMC-R, 1985) The structural orga-
nization of Headquarters, AMC is depicted in Figure II-l.
Of interest to this research effort is the Depot Op-
erations Branch of the Maintenance Division under the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Supply, Maintenance and Transportation.
The Depot Operations Branch provides policy, procedures, and
guidance for:
(1) Short-, mid-, and long-range depot maintenance facil-
ity planning to ascertain facility requirements by
size, numbers and types including determinations for
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(2) Determination of depot work specifications, mainte-
nance production standards, plant and production fa-
cility capacity, and its utilization.
(3) Accomplishment of the technical aspects of* depot main-
tenance mobilization industrial preparedness planning.
(4) Determination of that part of depot maintenance work-
load to be accomplished by commercial contract.
(5) Management of capability engineering data reporting
systems.
(6) Management of plant equipment programs. (AMC-R, 1985)
AMC has dictated a uniform organizational structure
to which all of the depots and depot activities must sub-
scribe. However, among the various depots, AMC has classi-
fied them functionally as one of the following:
(1) A multi-purpose supply distribution depot that has the
primary function of receipt, issue, storage and main-
tenance of designated supplies including ammunition to
overseas theaters and to a geographical part of CONUS
.
(2) A General Supply Distribution Depot that has the same
primary functions of a multi-purpose depot except for
ammunition.
(3) A Maintenance Depot that is assigned one or more fam-
ilies of commodities for performance of wholesale
maintenance (both multi-purpose and General Supply
Distribution Depots may have maintenance mission in
support of assigned commodities).
(4) A depot activity has the primary function of receipt,
storage and issue of slow moving supplies and is
organized and staffed on an austere basis and is sat-
ellited on another depot for command, normal base
operations and overhead functions. (DARCOM-R, 1977)
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3 . Major Subordinate Commands
Within the AMC organizational structure there are 11
major subordinate commands, 12 maintenance depots, and six
depot activities. A summary organizational chart is pre-
sented in Figure II-2. The 11 major subordinate commands all
possess equal rank and report directly to AMC. However, it
is the interaction between the Depot Systems Command (DES-
COM) , the other major subordinate commands, and the depots/
depot activities that forms the nucleus of the Army's mainte-
nance effort. The names, functions, and locations of the
seven major subordinate commands relevant to this effort are:
(1) Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) : TACOM maintains
cognizance over the development, procurement, distri-
bution and support of all tracked and wheeled combat,
tactical and general purpose vehicles. TACOM is head-
quartered in Warren, Michigan.
(2) Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM)
:
AMCCOM is responsible for providing and performing
life-cycle management of research and development,
engineering, procurement, and material readiness func-
tions for (a) conventional and nuclear weapons, (b)
ammunition, (c) chemical warfare and chemical bio-
logical defensive systems/material, (d) fire control
systems. AMCCOM is headquartered in Rock Island,
Illinois
.
(3) Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM): AVSCOM maintains
cognizance over research and development and material
readiness of all Army airframes. AVSCOM is headquar-
tered in St. Louis, Missouri.
(4) Troop Support Command (TROSCOM): TROSCOM maintains
cognizance over research and development and material
readiness associated with troop support, e.g. clothes,
food, protective garments and gear. TROSCOM is head-
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(5) Communications-Electronic Command (CECOM): CECOM is
responsible for the development and acquisition of
command, control and communications systems and the
support of these systems in the field. CECOM is head-
quarted at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
(6) Missile Command (MICOM): MICOM is responsible for the
Army's missile and rocket program, including research,
development, procurement and the continued support of
weapons systems once they are operational. MICOM is
headquarted at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
(7) Depot Systems Command (DESCOM): DESCOM functions as
the maintenance coordinator within AMC and also serves
as an intermediary between the other major subordinate
commands and the Army's depots. DESCOM is headquarted
at Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.
(Tackett, 1984)
As described by AMC, the responsibilities of the
major subordinate commands are:
(1) Coordinating with AMC during development of initial
maintenance requirements and programs to insure proper
support.
(2) Determining depot level material maintenance require-
ments and developing appropriate maintenance support
service program requirements for the current and plan-
ning years.
(3) Procuring and positioning repair parts required to
support depot material maintenance programs.
(4) Providing Repair Parts and Special Tools List (RPSTL)
and Depot Maintenance Parts Requirements Lists (DMPRL)
to each requesting depot maintenance activity.
(5) Preparing a Depot Maintenance Work Requirements (DMWR)
for each item of equipment under its management for
which depot maintenance tasks are identified.
(6) Assuring that required Depot Maintenance Plant Equip-
ment (DMPE) capability is developed/procured for new
weapon systems to coincide with the generation of
first reparable assets. (This involves the use of ap-
propriated funds (specifically the POM process within
the PPBS system) to ensure that the requisite special
22
maintenance equipment is in place at the depots when
the first of a new weapon system arrives at the depots
for repair.) (AMC-R, 1985)
B. DEPOT SYSTEMS COMMAND
1
.
History of the Depot Systems Command
Although the heritage of DESCOM and the Army's depots
can be traced back to the American Revolution, DESCOM was
established in August 1976 under DARCOM Permanent Order 17-2.
DESCOM commands and controls 17 U.S. Army depots and depot
activities during peacetime (18 in wartime) in the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The order creat-
ing DESCOM by DARCOM (now AMC ) was the result of a study
called Project Delta. That project investigated ways to
better manage the depots and led to DESCOM' s mission of the
command and control of all of AMC ' s depots and depot activi-
ties that receive, store, issue, maintain, and dispose of
assigned commodities. DESCOM was also made responsible for
the management and execution of the worldwide reconciliation
program and the evaluation of Army workload assets. DESCOM
was also assigned the responsibility of operating and main-
taining the Army's Logistics Data Base. (DESCOM-R, 1985)
Figure II-3 illustrates the relationship between AMC,
DESCOM and the depots/depot activities.
2
.
Mission of the Depot Systems Command
The major mission areas pertinent to this study as
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Note I: Tooele Army Depot maintains surveillance monitoring of conventional ammunition opera-
tions and property at Navajo Depot Activity INADA). Peacetime operations at NADA are
performed by the Arizona National Guard. Upon mobtlization, NADA returns to the US
Army Depot System Command under the direction and control of Tooele Army Depot
Source: Depot System Command Regulation 10-2
Figure 1 1 —3
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(1) Preparing Automatic Data Processing (ADP) programs to
produce maintenance management information.
(2) Developing a central data repository relative to or-
ganic depot maintenance resources (e.g., manpower,
floor space, special tools) to accomplish the world-
wide Five-Year Depot Maintenance Facility Workload and
Resource Plan to allow:
(a) Rapid visibility of existing depot maintenance
capabilities and capacities.
(b) Determination of potential changes in capabili-
ties and capacities to meet current workloads and
future requirements.
(3) Designating primary, secondary (if required) depot re-
pair facilities.
(4) Developing a worldwide Five-Year Maintenance Facility
Workload and Resource Plan by using the requirements
generated by direct Army programs and the reimbursable
depot maintenance workloads developed by the MSCs.
(5) Executing the depot maintenance portion of the Army
Materiel Plan (AMP) and related supporting budget
documents
.
(6) Developing a depot workload distribution plan for each
year following current program budget and manpower
guidance received from AMC.
(7) Planning, programing, and allocating maintenance work-
load to meet U.S. Army readiness requirements for
target and outyear programs.
(8) Management and control of overall programing, work-
loading and scheduling of depot maintenance programs
for target and outyear programs.
(9) Reporting disbursements (billing paid) to the appro-
priate MSC.
(10) Assuring that each depot maintenance activity has a
balanced workload (for current and budget years) with-
in available resources through coordination with the
MSCs and AMC. (DESCOM-R, 1985)
An organizational structure of DESCOM is depicted in
Figure II-4.
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3 . Functions of the Depot Systems Command
DESCOM's major function is that of coordination be-
tween the MSCs, the depots, and AMC on matters of maintenance
assignment, disbursements, and financial budgeting matters.
(DESCOM-2, 1985) Realizing the special requirements that
inter-organizational coordination can impose upon an organi-
zation (such as communication and control), DESCOM has estab-
lished a Liaison Office reporting to the Chief of Staff,
DESCOM. The Liaison Office is the DESCOM representative to
AMC and keeps the Commanding General, DESCOM, informed of all
current U.S. Army programs which have immediate or future
interest for DESCOM. Additionally, the office serves as the
DESCOM point of contact within AMC for information concerning
the management of DESCOM depots and depot activities. The
office also serves as the primary point of contact for all
elements of DESCOM in congressional matters and manages the
Commanding General ' s program for legislative/congressional
matters. Lastly, the office serves as principal staff advis-
er to the Commanding General, DESCOM, on matters pertaining
to the procedural relationships/agreements between DESCOM and
AMC. (DESCOM-R, 1985)
Central to DESCOM's control over the budgeting and
execution of depot level maintenance is a management tool
known as an AMC Procurement Request Order Number (PRON). A
PRON is a discrete 14 digit number established for the man-
agement control and identification of program directives and
27
work orders. Additionally, PRONs are used during actual
maintenance operations to: (1) track job costs and progress,
(2) aid in the preparation of status, performance and deliv-
ery reports, and (3) identify contractual obligations under-
taken by a depot on behalf of a customer. For planning
purposes, PRONs are established by the program element man-
agers of the MSCs for the current year, budget year, and four
outyears. A program element manager determines overall Army
maintenance policy for a weapon system (e.g., M60A3 tank).
The quantities of items within the PRONs are then used as an
indicator for future maintenance requirements. Along with
the PRONs, DESCOM uses the Operational Plan Summary (OPS-25)
series forms and the reimbursable depot maintenance workloads
developed by the major commands to arrive at the worldwide
Five-Year Depot Maintenance Facility Workload and Resource
Plan. OPS-25 series forms refer to direct Army programs and
are used to document requirements for the resource planning
and programming purposes for all program elements. The five-
year plan is updated on a more or less continuing basis.
(DARCOM-R, 1982) DESCOM further refines the five-year plan
to arrive at projected depot workload for the respective
years. DESCOM starts with the projected fielding require-
ment, (this is obtained from the projected force structure)
subtracts units on hand, adds to that units to be received
from vendors and the difference is the depots projected
maintenance requirements.
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The depots receive long-range planning guidance in
the form of a magnetic tape twice a year, in February and
October. This guidance is based upon the requirements for
the three outyears. For example, when a depot receives the
tape in October, 1985, the projected requirements represented
are for FY87/88/89. For the budget year, the depots receive
planned actual workloads (in the form of planned actual
PRONs) in May of FY minus one. ( Sollenberger , 1985) Plan-
ned workloads become funded work orders (depots are author-
ized to begin work) when a maintenance authorized quantity/
man-year citing of funds has been accomplished by DESCOM
(operations and maintenance, Army (0&M,A) ) and/or MSC re-
imbursable) and its subsequent acceptance by the performing
activity. (DARCOM-R, 1982)
Operations and maintenance funds, which are appro-
priated by Congress and limited to a specific fiscal year,
are used by the customers to pay for work performed by the
depots. The depots are part of the Army Industrial Fund
(AIF) and as such, their operating funds are revolving (the
depots pay for the expenses of their maintenance activities
with their funds and are periodically reimbursed as work is
completed). The depots use an amount of money known as the
corpus to fund their operations. The corpus is approved and
allocated by Congress. The revolving aspect of the Army
Industrial Fund allows it to sustain itself without requiring
additional infusions of cash from Congress. When revenue is
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received from the customers for work performed, DESCOM reim-
burses the depots thereby replenishing the cash to finance
future work. (Naval Postgraduate School, 1984) The funds
received by the customers are identified with specific PRONs
.
These funds are then retained by DESCOM and are disbursed to
the depots for work completed plus progress payments for
work-in-process up to the amount specified in the order.
Since the overhaul cycle of a tank is 58 days, tanks entered
into repair near the end of the fiscal year would not be com-
pleted before the end of September but would be accounted for
as work-in-process and the depot would be reimbursed through
progress payments.
Customer billings are processed by DESCOM semi-month-
ly. The billings for reimbursable orders are based upon
actual costs incurred. The billings for fixed price (stabi-
lized rate) orders are based upon actual costs incurred
except that the total amount billed cannot exceed the dollar
figure specified in the order. Revenue for fixed price
orders is earned based upon the computation of completed phy-
sical quantity times the unit fixed price. The final bill
for fixed price orders is based upon completed quantities
times the authorized unit fixed price, not actual costs.
(DARCOM, 1982)
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C. ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT
The individual depots complete the organizational struc-
ture of the Army's depot level maintenance effort. For the
sake of brevity, all of the depots and their missions/over-
haul designations are not addressed. However, generally
speaking a depots' mission includes both a supply and a main-
tenance function. The supply and maintenance functions are
combined to generate 11 possible overhaul designations for a
depot. Depots are usually designated in four categories,
e.g., automotive, combat vehicles, missile systems, and muni-
tions. (DESCOM 10-1, 1984) This chapter concludes with a
discussion of Anniston Army Depot, the depot where the re-
search was conducted.
1 . History of Anniston Army Depot
While Great Britain was effecting the rescue of over
300,000 allied soldiers from the beach at Dunkirk in 1940,
the process to establish a depot in the Anniston, Alabama
area was already underway. The Chief of Ordnance was search-
ing for a new facility for the purpose of bomb storage. In
November of 1940 an initial land purchase was made for 10,640
acres. Over the years, additional land has been added to
bring Anniston to its current acreage of 15,246. This figure
does not include the Coosa River Storage area (2,834 acres),
located a few miles from the depot, which Anniston uses for
storage. Construction at Anniston was begun in early 1941
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and the installation was officially designated Anniston Ord-
nance Depot in October of 1941. Initially, Anniston was
receiving about two railroad boxcars of ordnance a day; how-
ever, with the increased munitions production accompanying
the United States' entrance into World War II, incoming muni-
tions rapidly exceeded 150 boxcars a day. In the latter part
of 1943 the Chief of Ordnance ordered that the management of
six of the larger depots be transferred to civilians so that
the depots might profit by their experience in management
techniques. The Chrysler Corporation assumed management of
Anniston Ordnance Depot in October, 1943 on a cost-plus-
fixed-fee basis. A subsidiary known as the Anniston Ware-
house Corporation was organized "to operate the depot as an
establishment to receive, store, pack for export and domestic
shipment, maintain, modify, and ship ordnance material, and
perform such other work as the Contracting Officer may di-
rect" (ANADR 10-2, 1984). During this period, employment
reached 6,780. However, in September of 1945 this contract
was terminated and the Ordnance Corps once again assumed
control of the depot. During the Korean conflict the in-
creased demands on Anniston' s capabilities resulted in the
construction of Depot Maintenance Shop Building 400. This
structure covers approximately five acres and houses the
repair and overhaul of vehicles. In 1962 the Office of the
Chief of Ordnance was deactivated as a result of the reor-
ganization of the Army. Anniston was redesignated Anniston
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Army Depot and placed under the command of the U.S. Army
Materiel Command. A major milestone was reached in 1979
when the 2,000th tank rebuild was completed. In 1980 the
Lexington-Blue Grass Depot Activity, located in Lexington,
Kentucky, was placed under the command of the Commander,
Anniston Army Depot. (ANADR 10-2, 1984)
2 . Mission of Anniston Army Depot
Currently, Anniston' s missions include combat vehicle
rebuild and conversion programs, small arms and artillery re-
build, and the maintenance of various missile systems. In
addition, Anniston is the largest ammunition storage facility
within DESCOM. To achieve its mission, Anniston possess
facilities approaching $0.75 billion and an annual operating
budget over $250 million. The $120 million payroll provides
economic opportunities for the 5,000 employees. It takes
that kind of support to manage an inventory valued at $3.2
billion which includes the shipping and receiving of over
400,000 tons of supplies, equipment, and ammunition a year
and the repair of over 700 combat vehicles annually. The
depot covers overs 25 square miles of land with 2,000 build-
ings, 8.5 million square feet of floor space, 250 miles of
roads, and 46 miles of railroads. (ANADR 10-2, 1984)
In response to management initiatives undertaken by
DESCOM, Anniston was designated a Center of Technical Excel-
lence (CTX) to meet the challenge of force modernization.
This concept establishes a single point of contact for each
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major weapons system. Because of the vast amount of techni-
cal expertise and experience available at Anniston, the CTX
concept is intended to bridge the gap between producer and
customer by ensuring early depot involvement in the life-
cycle of new weapons systems. Anniston has been designated
the CTX for the Ml Abrams tank, the M60A3 tank and the Hell-
fire Modular Missile System. (Anniston Army Depot, no date)
3 . Organization and Responsibilities
As directed by AMC, the responsibilities of the Com-
mander, Anniston Army Depot are:
(1) Establish production schedules based upon the priority
of the weapon system and resource availability, and
maintain constant consideration for cost effectiveness
when doing so.
(2) Accumulate, record, and report production cost on a
total cost basis.
(3) Transmit all program status reports (PSR) to DESCOM.
(4) Report completions and final closeout/billing of all
PRONs.
(5) Monitor depot maintenance program expenditures and in-
sure that funds expended do not exceed funds author-
ized on cost reimbursable programs.
(6) Assure that depot developed unit cost estimates are
realistic and definable. (DARCOM-R, 1982)
Excluding the civilian executive assistant and the
special staff, the Commander, Anniston Army Depot controls
his organization through eight directorates. They are:
Maintenance, Supply, Ammunition, Quality Assurance, Admin-
istration and Services, Resources Management, Information
Management and Procurement. Although located 420 miles away,
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Lexington-Blue Grass Depot Activity essentially functioned as
Anniston's ninth directorate, until it became a depot on
September 15, 1985 (see Figure II-5). A discussion of the
directorates follows. The material was adapted from ANADR
10-2.
a. Directorate for Resources Management
The mission of the Resources Management Director-
ate is to:
(1) Serve as the depot financial manager,
(2) Assist the Commander in the management of financial
resources and the administrative control of funds to
include the maintenance of revolving and appropriated
fund control procedures,
(3) Provide programming, budgeting, finance and account-
ing, management review and analysis and industrial
Figure II-5 engineering services, and
(4) Provide manpower and organizational control.
To achieve its mission this directorate is organ-
ized into five divisions encompassing seven branches. Another
important function of this directorate is that of productiv-
ity improvement. The directorate strives for production
efficiencies whether it is long-range strategic planning
(workloads and facilities) or short-term efforts for new
equipment. Productivity improvements are planned and gen-
erated through better facilities, labor-saving equipment and
positive people programs (Quality Circles, Productivity Gain
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b. Directorate for Procurement
The mission of the Procurement Directorate is to
purchase material and equipment not available through normal
supply channels. In addition to procurement, this director-
ate also contracts for supplies, services and equipment.
This directorate's organizational structure consists of six
divisions.
c. Directorate for Administration and Services
The mission of this directorate is to:
(1) Provide administrative support to the depot to include
adjutant, mobilization and emergency plans, Reserve
Force training and non-appropriated fund activities,
(2) Provide administrative and logistical support to the
Special Staff,
(3) Provide support services for the depot, including se-
curity, facilities engineering, equipment operations
and maintenance,
(4) Provide organizational effectiveness services.
This directorate not only provides the personnel
services for the employees of the depot but it maintains and
repairs over 7,500 pieces of equipment consisting of rolling
stock, production machinery, motor vehicles, helicopters, and
airplanes. With such a large task, the Directorate for Ad-
ministration and Services has 800 employees, five divisions,
eight offices, and 23 branches to achieve its mission.
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d. Directorate for Supply
The mission of the Supply Directorate is to:
(1) Plan, program, manage, and accomplish receipt, stor-
age, inventory, preservation, packaging, issuing and
shipping of depot and mission General Supply, and
(2) Provide for the internal movement of material.
Approximately 20 percent of the depot's work
force, and a yearly budget of over $45 million, form the core
of Supply. It requires those resources to maintain and keep
track of the more than 900,000 tons of material that is
stored in over six million square feet of covered storage
space. As regards shipping, approximately 220,000 line items
totalling 154,000 tons were received and 185,000 line items
totalling 137,000 tons were shipped during a recent 12 month
period. The Directorate for Supply is organized into six
divisions and 22 branches.
e. Directorate for Ammunition Operations
The mission of this directorate is to:
(1) Plan, program, manage, and accomplish receipt, stor-
age, preservation, packaging, issuing, and shipping of
depot and mission ammunition and missiles,
(2) Perform the renovation, modification, demilitarization
and disposal of material,
(3) Provide for the internal movement of material,




Since the Directorate for Ammunition Operations
has primary support responsibility for the Lance, TOW, Shil-
lelagh, and Dragon missile systems, it also has the distinc-
tion of being the Army's primary anti-tank missile support
operation. This directorate employs approximately 250 people
and a budget of $5 million to achieve its mission. Recently,
the Directorate for Ammunition Operations renovated ten mil-
lion rounds of ammunition, shipped 28,000 tons of ammunition,
and received 3,200 different line items. To support its
operations, this directorate is organized into three divi-
sions and seven branches.
f. Directorate for Information Management
The Information Management Directorate performs
the following functions in the accomplishment of its mission:
(1) Manages the depot automatic data processing (ADP) man-
agement information systems, office automation, ADP
security, and ADP communications resources through the
life-cycle managment process, and
(2) Provides guidance, advice and assistance to management
on technical and procedural matters concerning auto-
mated systems design, development, implementation,
operation, computer technology, automated communica-
tions, and the integration within the total depot.
In order to accomplish its mission, as well as to
provide computer services to Lexington-Blue Grass Depot
Activity, Rock Island Arsenal and the Tank and Automotive
Command, this directorate operates three shifts a day, seven
days a week. The Directorate for Management Information
39
Systems is organized into three divisions encompassing eight
branches
.
g. Directorate for Quality Assurance
The Quality Assurance Directorate is responsible
for quality control depot-wide including, but not restricted
to, supply, maintenance, ammunition, and internal calibra-
tion. Specifically, this directorate's mission is to develop
and administer the technical policies, plans, systems, and
controls required to meet the objectives of the Depot Quality
Program. This directorate pioneered the oil analysis prog-
nostic/diagnostic program currently in place throughout
DESCOM to improve the quality and reliability of tanks,
engines and transmissions. The Directorate for Quality
Assurance is organized into four divisions with 16 branches.
h. Directorate for Maintenance
The Maintenance Directorate is the largest direc-
torate at Anniston both in terms of dollars and manpower.
The mission of this directorate is to perform depot mainte-
nance on assigned weapons, weapons support systems and com-
modity groups including repair, overhaul, modification or
conversion of equipment and material. Maintenance also pro-
vides technical assistance to the users of Army material.
The Maintenance Directorate is organized into five divisions,
19 branches and one office (see Figure II-6). This director-
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the entire depot workforce and over one-half of the depot's
budget.
In addition to the overhaul and conversion work
performed on tanks, Maintenance is also responsible for ar-
mored assault vehicles, small arms, mortars, recoilless
rifles, optical and electronic fire control items, tank
engines, transmissions, and missile guidance and control sys-
tems. This directorate not only performs repairs at Annis-
ton, the technicians of the Missile Guidance Branch travel
world-wide to modify missile systems. Maintenance maintains
a 24-hour hotline to answer maintenance related questions
that equipment users may have for weapon systems such as
tanks, small arms, missile guidance and control systems for
land combat systems, ground and air TOWs, Dragon, Lance, and
Shillelagh missiles. (ANADR 10-2, 1984) Not only does Main-
tenance provide continuous skills training for its in-house
labor force, it also provides training for Reserve Compon-




III. UNIFORM COST ACCOUNTING AND STABILIZED RATES
This chapter describes two cost systems used by depots,
they are: (1) Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction
7220. 29-H, and (2) stabilized rates. DoD Instruction
7220. 29-H dictates the procedures whereby depots record and
assign costs; and, the stabilized rate concept is used as a
pricing mechanism generating the revenues. DoD Instruction
7220. 29-H is a guideline for cost accounting at DoD depots.
The subsection of this chapter on DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H
addresses the objectives and reporting system as described
by the instruction. The subsection of this chapter on sta-
bilized rates concerns itself with workload estimation,
overhead levels, rate development and rate validation. A
stabilized rate is a predetermined dollar amount expressed as
a fixed price per unit or a fixed rate per direct labor hour.
The rates are used by the depots to bill customers for work
performed
.
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 7220. 29-H
Referred to as the handbook, Department of Defense (DoD)
Instruction 7220. 29-H "... (a) sets forth a set of prin-
ciples, standards, policies, definitions and requirements
for uniform cost accounting and reporting by all DoD depot
maintenance activites, and (b) provides criteria for the
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identification and segregation of depot maintenance costs
from maintenance support costs and cost accounting and
reporting requirements for maintenance support activities"
(DoD, 1975).
1. The Objectives of DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H
The objectives listed below were obtained from the
handbook
:
a. The principal objective of this handbook is to estab-
lish a uniform cost accounting system for use in accumu-
lating the costs of depot maintenance activities as they
relate to the weapon systems supported or items maintained.
The handbook provides principles and procedures to assure
uniform recordation, accumulation, and reporting on depot
maintenance operations and maintenance support activities.
The cost system will be controlled by a double-entry,
accrual-based general ledger accounting system.
b. The information provided by the cost system will assist
in the measurement of productivity, the development of per-
formance and cost standards and determination of areas for
management emphasis. In addition, it will provide a means
of identifying maintenance capability, duplication of ca-
pacity and indicate both actual and potential areas for
interservice support of maintenance workload.
2
.
The Uniform Cost Accounting (UCA) System
The cost accounting standards contained within the
handbook apply to governrnent-owned and government-operated
facilities. According to the handbook, the standards con-
tained therein were adopted from standards established by the
Cost Accounting Standards Board pursuant to Public Law 91-379
(84 USC 796). The standards developed by the Cost Account-
ing Standards Board are concerned with the application to
Federal government contracts of cost accounting areas such as
consistency in estimating, accumulating and reporting cost,
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the allocation of corporate overhead to specific contracts
and the use of standard costs. The basis for cost accumu-
lation as stipulated in the handbook is job order costing.
Specifically:
A job order cost accounting system will be used to gather
depot maintenance costs. A job order system is a method of
cost accounting whereby costs are compiled for a specific
quantity of product, equipment, repair, or other service
that moves through the production process as a continually
identifiable unit. The applicable material, direct labor,
other direct costs, and the allocated portions of overhead
are charged to specific job orders.
The handbook requires individual job order assignment for
items subject to examination and evaluation when:
(1) Estimated cost is in excess of $90,000 per item,
(2) Monthly, if units have the same identification number
(e.g., national stock number) and the per unit esti-
mate of repair is $15 , 000-$90, 000, and
(3) Quarterly, if units have the same identification num-
ber and the per unit estimate of repair is less than
$15,000. (DoD, 1975)
For units not subject to examination and evaluation, the
handbook requires individual job orders when:
(1) Monthly, if units have the same identification number
and the per unit estimate of repair is $15,000 or more
(2) Quarterly, if units have the same national stock num-
ber and the per unit estimate of repair is less than
$15,000 and the cumulative total for the quarter is
projected to be $375,000 or more
(3) Quarterly, if homogeneous groupings of items by stock
classifications or repair categories where the esti-
mated unit cost is less than $15,000 and the planned
work on any one identification number is less than
$375,000. An example of a homogeneous grouping would
be a subcomponent used in more than one weapon system.
The dollar limit for the quarterly group job order is
$750,000. (DoD, 1975)
45
3. Description of the DoD 7220. 29-H Reporting System
The handbook directs that each Military Service shall
maintain a magnetic tape prepared in accordance with the spe-
cifics listed below. The tape is updated quarterly on a cu-
mulative basis for completed job orders. Within 90 days of
the end of a fiscal year, a final fiscal year tape is to be
submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions
and Logistics). Fiscal year-end tapes are to be retained by
the services indefinitely since "retention of the data will
allow portrayal of weapon system maintenance costs trends"
(Department of Defense, 1975). The services are required to
maintain the quarterly tapes for two years and are directed
to ensure that the tapes are in Extended Binary Coded Decimal
Interchange Code (EBCDIC), unblocked or block 10, nine track,
and with a tape density of 1600 or 6250 characters per inch.
In addition to performing validity checks of the data prior
to submission to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense (Acquisition and Logistics), the services have the
additional requirement of designing cost and production
reporting systems so than an audit trail exists from the
quarterly data tape back to the job order. The second
requirement is to facilitate the analysis of information.
An individual data record is required for each type of depot
maintenance work performed for a single customer at an indi-
vidual activity on the same item or grouping of items identi-
fied by national stock number. The data are arranged on the
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tape in "fields". There are 50 fields representing five
categories
:
(1) Record Identification - fields 1-3,
(2) Identification of facility - fields 4-8,
(3) Identification of Item/Service and Customer - fields
9-15,
(4) Costs - fields 17-33, and
(5) Production Data - fields 34-50.
A detailed breakdown of the various fields is presented in
Appendix A.
4. Theoretical Foundation of Uniform Cost Accounting
The Uniform Cost Accounting system is a variation of
a textbook job order costing system. Job order costing
should be designed to collect the cost of materials, labor,
and factory overhead for a specific job even though several
jobs are going through production at the same time (Matz and
Usry, 1984). A brief glance at Appendix A reveals that the
Uniform Cost Accounting cost category requirements are very
specific. Uniform Cost Accounting does not require separate
job orders for each physical unit; rather, units may be
grouped together in a lot and the costs of production are
charged against one job order. The result, average costs of
production for the units in the job order.
Uniform Cost Accounting differs from what accounting
theory would lead one to believe in the area of work-in-pro-
cess. At the end of a reporting period jobs will probably
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exist that have not been finished. Normally, these jobs are
posted to the work-in-process account. Uniform Cost Account-
ing specifically excludes all jobs that are not finished.
Consequently, there are no provisions for the reporting of
jobs in the work-in-process account. However, Anniston main-
tains approximately $10 million in the work-in-process ac-
count. The $10 million represents approximately ten percent
of yearly revenues.
B. STABILIZED RATES
Except where specifically noted, the information contained
in this section was obtained from Mr. Tim Simmons, DESCOM
Budget Officer, and from the document Financial Management of
the Army Industrial Fund .
1 . Stabilized Rates Defined
The purpose of stabilized rates is to determine in
advance the prices that will be charged to the customers by
the depots (U. S. House of Representatives, 1978). Accord-
ingly, depots are required to establish fixed rates which may
be expressed as costs per man-hour, man-day, unit of output
(e.g., fixed price per unit), unit of input, or any other
manner which reflects the effort of repair. The primary
reason for stabilized rates is, by design, customer conven-
ience. The customers of Anniston Army Depot (primarily the
Major Subordinate Commands) operate with appropriated funds.
To fulfill the requirements of the DoD component of the
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Federal budgeting system (known as PPBS), it is imperative
for them to know, with a degree of certainty, what prices
they will be charged for depot level work so that they can
formulate their budgets for operations and maintenance funds
with some confidence.
2. History of Stabilized Rates
During the high inflationary years of the early to
mid 1970 's the depots found themselves revising their rates
upward considerably throughout the budget year. The revi-
sion itself normally occurred on a quarterly basis. Since
the customer's operations and maintenance accounts did not
have sufficient funds to pay for the budgeted workload at the
new and increased prices, it became necessary to reduce the
number of units to be reworked. As the per unit price in-
creased and available funds remained constant, the customers
were forced to submit a fewer number of units to the depots
for repair than had been budgeted for by either the customers
or the depots. As the workload base decreased, the depots
once again found themselves having to revise prices upwards
to recoup their fixed expenses as required by the regulations
of the Industrial Fund. With double-digit inflation con-
tinuing, the situation exacerbated itself. As a result, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense revised DoD Directive 7410.4 and
established a program for rate stabilization to be used by
DoD Industrial Fund activities (e.g., airplane and tank depot
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level repair facilities as well as public shipyards). Rate
stabilization has been fully implemented since FY77.
Prior to rate stabilization, the Industrial Fund
activities (all depots are Industrial Fund activities) were
required to develop and use stabilized rates for billing
purposes throughout the year. Due to the lead time in rate
preparation (approximately two years before the fiscal year)
the rates were based upon a three year concept. Prior to
FY77 the depots were required to break-even on a yearly basis
(a net operating result (NOR) of zero, in other words, reve-
nues=expenses ) . The rates that the depots billed their cus-
tomers were updated quarterly (if required) to ensure that
revenues and expenses were equal. However, the use of stabi-
lized rates for billing precludes that since the revenues
that the depots will earn throughout the year are based on
the stabilized rates.
Even though expenses may change during the year, with
rare exceptions, the stabilized rates are not revised to re-
flect current costs. Since the rates are not revised during
the year, the accrued profit or loss will be recouped (zero-
ed-out) with the determination of furture year's stabilized
rates. For example, the profit/loss experienced in FY85 will
be recouped (zeroed-out) with the determination of FY88
rates. Of course there are other significant contributing
factors in the determination of any one year's stabilized
rates, but it should be noted that prior years' profit/loss
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have a definite role in the process. Referred to previously
in this paragraph, the term NOR (net operating result) has
two distinct meanings. It can refer to what is generally-
known as operating profit or it can refer to a surcharge
(positive or negative) included in the stabilized rates. For
ease of understanding the author has substituted the word
profit for NOR when that is the context in which the word is
being used.
Under rate stabilization, therefore, the Army Indus-
trial Fund acts like a shock absorber to absorb the financial
gains and/or losses occurring throughout a fiscal year until
the rates are adjusted in the following years. Since indi-
vidual depots no longer strive to achieve zero profit, the
burden of managing the cumulative profit depot-wide has fall-
en upon DESCOM since the solvency of the Army Industrial Fund
must still be maintained. The depots' financial objective is
to end the fiscal year with a predetermined profit or loss.
The process of stabilized rate formulation has two
distinct components. One component is the cost application
rates that are developed at the depots which form the basis
of stabilized rates and the second component is the projec-
tion of depot-wide workload requirements for the FY under
consideration. The discussion begins with depot-wide work-
load determination, which includes: (1) a paradox involved
in estimating the workload known as the Army Industrial Fund
dilemma, (2) DESCOM workload estimation, (3) determination of
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overhead levels, and (4) the conversion of labor hours to
work-years and dollars. The discussion then focuses on sta-
bilized rate development by Anniston Army Depot. Stabilized
rate development includes: (1) man-hour work measurement
standards, (2) the internal operating budget, (3) labor and
overhead cost development, (4) labor and overhead rate de-
velopment, (5) stabilized rate development summarized, (6)
stabilized rate validation, and (7) stabilized rate revision.
3 . Depot-wide Workload Determination
a. The Army Industrial Fund Dilemma
Before addressing Army Industrial Fund workload
determination and the subsequent prices that are billed to
the customers by the depots, the reader should be made aware
of the "AIF dilemma". As with any heavily capitalized enter-
prise, the depots of the Army Industrial Fund have certain
fixed cost that are incurred regardless of the actual work-
load or variable expenses. The direct labor base used to
absorb the fixed cost as a dollar amount per hour signifi-
cantly affects the ultimate dollar figure. For example,
assume that a hypothetical depot has fixed cost of $15 mil-
lion. In addition, with each direct labor hour worked vari-
able cost will also be incurred. Assume that the labor base
is one million direct hours and variable cost are $35 mil-
lion. The combined fixed and variable cost are $50 million.
Divided by one million direct labor hours the cost per hour
is $50. However, if only 750 thousand direct labor hours had
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been worked, the total cost would be $42.5 million for a rate
of $56.67 per direct labor hour. The result is that as work-
load decreases incurred cost per direct labor hour increases.
Therefore, before the depots can give the customers a firm
fixed price or fixed rate per hour that it will charge the
customers, the customers must tell the depots how much work-
load they intend upon ordering. The paradox exists because
the customers cannot know how much work they will order until
they know the price that will be charged. Since customers
deal with appropriated funds (primarily 0&M,A) they arrive at
their workload ordering capability by dividing appropriations
by fixed price per unit to yield funded units of work. How-
ever, the fixed price cannot be determined by the depots
until they know the projected workload. To help overcome
this dilemma, the formulation process is begun by estimating
the workload based upon available funding,
b. DESCOM Workload Estimation
Workload estimation begins during the first quar-
ter two years before budget execution (e.g., November, 1985
for FY87). The National Maintenance Points of the Commodity
Commands determine their workload estimates based upon the
funding guidance from Headquarters, Army Materiel Command.
This projected workload is contained in the OPS-25 Workload
Summary and is loaded into the DESCOM Master File for Main-
tenance. DESCOM uses this information to update the Army
Material Plan, which is a five-year maintenance forecast.
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DESCOM then projects target year maintenance requirements
by taking the projected equipment requirements inherent in
the proposed force structure, adding to that weapons to be
delivered by vendors, subtracting weapons on hand, and the
difference is the depots requirement [Solenberger, 1985].
Once the workload has been identified, historical
performance standards are used to express the workload in
direct labor terms. The total direct labor hour requirement
is then compared to the funding guidance received from AMC to
determine the workload (in direct labor hours) to be funded.
Based upon the direct labor hour levels of the maintenance,
supply and other programs in existence at a depot, DESCOM
determines the supporting overhead labor required and de-
velops a preliminary AIF budget. The direct labor hours in
the budget are based on anticipated workload. The indirect
labor hours are based upon direct/indirect ratios. (DESCOM,
1985) The budget, which is described in more detail later,
is developed by negotiations in a workshop with each depot.
The preliminary budget is given to the depot and the depot
presents its counter-proposal, if required. The negotiated
preliminary budget, known as the mark, is then presented to
the DESCOM Commander for final approval. Currently, the
depot commanders are to be personally present when this mark
is presented to the DESCOM Commander. Once approved, it
serves as the approved operating financial plan for the
depot.
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c. Determination of Overhead Levels
The determination of the overhead levels of the
budget is a major part of the negotiation/approval process.
The mission indirect labor hours are subjectively determined
based primarily upon attempting to maintain or improve the
direct-to-total labor hour ratio and any other known factors
which might impact the overhead labor (e.g., additional depot
support missions not involving direct labor, supervisory man-
ning levels). If, for example, the workload is increasing,
a depot is pressed for an improvement in the direct-to-total
ratio; however, with a declining workload, an improvement
will not be pressed. Additional overhead hours will be added
to the budget if the situation warrants. For example, if a
special project office is added to a depot for the purpose
of, say, the coordination of modernization efforts, this de-
velopment would be viewed as a justifiable increase. These
people are mission overhead and to the extent that they can-
not be absorbed within the existing overhead, additional
overhead hours are allowed.
The base operations overhead receives similar
treatment. Depots are expected to reduce base operations
overhead, however, if a depot can identify specific new
requirements then additional overhead hours may be allowed.
Base operations overhead is treated in more detail in a later
section.
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d. Conversion of Labor Hours to Workyears and Dollars
Once the direct and indirect labor hours are de-
termined, the overtime usage is determined based primarily
upon past history or, as happened in the FY85 budget, a deci-
sion to increase overtime usage in order to increase the
hours available with less people. The labor hours are divid-
ed by the productive hours per work-year for regular time
hours and by 2088 hours for overtime to determine work-years
(DESCOM, 1985). The productive hours per work-year varies by
depot and by mission. An emphasis is placed upon getting
more productive hours per regular work-year. After determin-
ing the regular work-years, the manpower requirements are
determined based upon current staffing levels and an internal
goal to use a core workforce of 90 percent full-time perma-
nent appointments with the remaining workforce comprised of
various alternative appointments such as temporaries and
on-call employees.
Following the manpower determination, the dollars
to support the manpower is determined based upon direct dol-
lars per direct labor hour and indirect dollars per indirect
labor hour. The budget year dollar figure per direct labor
hour and indirect labor hour is obtained by multiplying the
current dollar figure per direct labor hour and indirect
labor hour by an inflation factor obtained from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The inflation factor is
identical to that used in the President's Budget.
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After the workload and dollars are developed, the
rate and price setting process begins. Workload from DESCOMs
Master File for Maintenance is provided to the depots for
them to develop their initial fixed prices. The depots sub-
mit these prices to DESCOM for validation and adjustment to
conform with the approved AIF budget. The approved stabil-
ized rates are then used for the budget year prices and the
rates are given to the customers. This process is discussed
in more detail later.
4. Stabilized Rate Development at Anniston Army Depot
Stabilized rates are used by two directorates at An-
niston Army Depot, Supply and Maintenance. The Directorate
of Supply uses stabilized rates to bill customers for mate-
rials receipted, stored and shipped. The units of measure-
ment are usually expressed in tons (e.g., X dollars per ton
of ammunition shipped). The stabilized rates of the Supply
Directorate do not include material charges since all mate-
rials handled by Supply are financed through the Army's Stock
Fund. The Directorate of Maintenance uses stabilized rates
to bill customers for work performed (e.g., the overhaul of a
tank or the rebuilding of a Howitzer). The stabilized rates
developed by Anniston consist of three components: (1) the
cost application rate, (2) the materials charge, and (3)
other ( e.g., travel, commercial contracting). The cost
application rate is a summarized cost of labor and overhead
within a cost center (more on this later)
.
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Stabilized rates come in two forms: (1) fixed
price per unit, and (2) fixed rate per direct labor hour.
Since over 80 percent of Anniston's workload is based upon
the fixed price per unit concept, the discussion on stabi-
lized rate development refers to fixed prices per unit. The
development of fixed rates per direct labor hour is accom-
plished in a similar manner. The fixed rate per direct labor
hour includes all of the costs included in the fixed rate per
unit except material charges. Actual material charges are
expensed to a job when the work is being performed.
a. Man-hour Work Measurement Standards
One of the components of a fixed price is the
man-hour work measurement standard. Based upon the Depot
Maintenance Work Requirement (DMWR), technical manuals for
maintenance and the historical experience of earned work
measurement standard hours per line item, man-hour standards
are set which become the basis for production control, per-
formance and productivity measurement, and the key to fixed
price development. In developing the prices, the labor cost
is determined by multiplying the work measurement standard by
the labor rate for each cost center involved. This labor
rate is the current average rate for the cost center which
was determined through the internal operating budget.
There are two types of work measurement stan-
dards: the engineered standard and the technical estimate
standard. Both standards are established at the detail
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operation code level (e.g., disassembly and painting). The
detail operation code is listed along with the employees'
time on the Labor & Production Cards and they are tied back
to a Job Order/Production Control Number ( JO/PCN) . The
JO/PCN is a local derivative of the Army Materiel Command
Procurement Request Order Number (PRON). Labor production
and hours are reported by employees on labor and production
cards. Each day, the shop supervisor prepares the cards by
individual employees and turns them into a production clerk
(Wood, 1985). The Standard Depot System determines the
earned hours against the production standards and provides
the cost centers and other managers with an assessment of
performance.
To determine the engineered standards, the indus-
trial engineers perform a time-motion study on selected
employees performing the required operations on a representa-
tive sample of the standard to be developed/updated. The
standards are reviewed and updated continually as required
(e.g., when scope of work and/or technological changes are
present) (Johnson, 1985). DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H requires
revision at least every two years. Twenty-four percent of
the total maintenance manhours reported during the first half
of FY85 were covered by engineered standards. This percent-
age represents coverage against all maintenance labor hours
including direct, indirect and supervisory manhours. Since
the engineered standards are designed to reflect direct labor
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hours only, the engineered standards coverage is actually
much higher than 24 percent suggests. In fact, approximately
38 percent of the direct labor hours are covered by engineer-
ed standards (Gaddy, 1985).
The second type of work measurement standard is
the technical estimate. The industrial engineers prepare
this standard using historical, statistical and technical
data. The primary difference between the technical estimate
and the engineered standard is that a time-motion study is
not performed while formulating the technical estimate. Ap-
proximately 50 percent of incurred maintenance hours are
covered by technical estimates. JO/PCN's covered by tech-
nical estimates are converted to fixed price contracts at the
50 percent completion point. The remaining 12 percent of
maintenance hours are not covered by measurable standards.
These hours are covered by man-hour allowances which basic-
ally state that an hour worked is an hour earned. Examples
of man-hour allowances are the production planning and con-
trol functions and clerical support. (Johnson, 1985)
Cost data are accumulated for approximately 120
cost centers in the Maintenance Directorate, but for rate
development purposes the costs are pooled into eight pro-
ductive cost centers and five indirect cost centers (Gaddy,
1985). These costs are known as cost application rates.
Material and other direct cost are determined based upon
historical data (the mortality files). Historical mortality
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files are maintained on all line items previously repaired at
Anniston and it is this file that is the basis for material
requirements. Officially, the file is known as the End Item
Materiel Data Record (EIMDR). If a labor and material usage
standard does not exist (e.g., an item not previously re-
paired) then the industrial engineers formulate a standard
based upon time-motion studies and available statistical
information. The overhead cost is then added based on the
man-hour work measurement standard multiplied by the various
hourly overhead rates for the involved cost centers. The
cost application rates are the current costing rates deter-
mined through the internal operating budget (IOB) which is
discussed in detail below. Known or anticipated productivity
adjustments which are to occur prior to or during the budget
year are then subtracted from the cost by individual element
as appropriate. The productivity adjustment may be known or
unknown; in any case, if a depot does not apply an adjustment
then DESCOM will apply one (e.g., a nominal two percent)
(Monroe, 1985). All of these cost estimates are made by the
depot and submitted to DESCOM. Besides other adjustments, a
net operating result (NOR) factor is applied based upon a
rate per direct labor hour. In accordance with policy estab-
lished by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the same
rate (by mission) is used across the board at all depots.
The final result is the unadjusted budgeted fixed price.
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b. The Internal Operating Budget
The internal operating budget (IOB) is an inter-
nally prepared budget utilized throughout the depot system.
It provides each cost center and the depot as a whole with an
operating plan for manpower and expenses and is approved by
the Depot Commander. The IOB does not leave the depot, it is
an internal document. There are two purposes served by the
IOB. First, the IOB provides a means to manage and control
expenses at the local level by providing each cost center
supervisor with a monthly financial plan. To gauge depot
performance, a monthly financial status report is generated
comparing actual performance against budgeted performance.
A detailed analysis of all variances are included in the
report to aid appropriate management action. Excerpts of
the financial status report are presented in Appendix B. A
second purpose of the IOB is to develop the cost application
rates for Anniston. A cost application rate is a predeter-
mined rate which identifies the cost per direct labor hour
for each cost center and is the initial basis for what is
later known as a stabilized rate. This rate is used to de-
termine the cost of accomplishing workload within that cost
center. Properly developed the cost application rate will be
an average rate used for the entire year and by year end
actual costs will be within one percent of the applied costs.
Any deviations between applied and incurred cost is reflected
in the variance accounts of the accounting system and are
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closed to the operating result at year end. During the year,
these variances can be significant. For example, during the
winter months, the monthly utility bills are high as a con-
sequence of heating cost. Since the cost application rates
average the monthly utility bills, the utility bill component
of the cost application rates is constant throughout the
year. As a result, actual costs are higher during the winter
months than are applied costs. During the spring and summer
months, the reverse is true. If during the year, the depot's
evaluation indicates that the year end variance will be more
than one percent of the total, then a revision to the IOB is
required to adjust the cost application rates. This revision
is usually made quarterly, or as required. The revision is
for internal control purposes and reimburseable order
charges. The revision does not impact the prices charged to
customers during the current year for fixed price/rate
orders. However, the cost application rates that are current
in April of 1985 form the basis of FY 87 ' s stabilized rates,
c. Labor and Overhead Cost Development
Figure III-l describes the development of cost
from the cost center level through the various intermediate
organizational levels to the depot total. The square blocks
represent cost activities. The circles represent overhead
"pools" which collect cost for developing overhead rate ap-
plications. Starting at the bottom, the productive cost
centers prepare their labor cost input. The productive cost
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centers are those that are involved in direct labor work and
have both direct and indirect labor expenses. The labor rate
used for a cost center is a weighted average and is accelera-
ted to recover fringe benefits (e.g., vacation pay and sick
leave). The indirect expenses are accumulated in an overhead
pool called "within shop overhead" (hereafter referred to as
direct overhead). An example of this overhead would be the
cost center supervisor and any material cost that is not di-
rectly identifiable to a job.
The next level of cost centers is called pro-
ductive support. These are the cost centers which are
overhead to the general mission and their costs cannot be
identified with a specific productive cost center. Examples
are the production planning and control divisions, the Direc-
torate for Maintenance office, and the Directorate for Qual-
ity Assurance which is not economically identified with a
specific end item or process. These costs are summarized to
directorate level and accumulated in an overhead pool called
"above shop overhead" (hereafter referred to as indirect
overhead)
.
The base operations cost centers are summarized
to the depot level where their cost are accumulated in two
overhead pools called "base operations cost indirect expense"
(BOCIE) and "general and administrative expense" (GAE). To
comply with generally accepted conventions, general and ad-
ministrative expense will be referred to as G&A. BOCIE
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(hereafter referred to as base operations expense) is the
base operations cost which can be directly identifiable to a
benefiting directorate. Examples are the utility cost and
the facility engineering projects in support of the Direc-
torate for Maintenance and the guard force directly identi-
fiable to supporting the Directorate for Ammunition. G&A
consist of all other base operations support which cannot be
identified to specific directorates. Examples are the Comp-
troller staff and the guard force responsible for overall
security, (e.g., the gate guards).
d. Labor and Overhead Cost Application Rate
Development
Figure III-2 presents how the overhead is applied
the productive cost centers. The two productive cost centers
at the right have two elements of cost which become a part of
the cost application rate for these cost centers. The first
is the direct labor cost and the second is the direct over-
head cost for that cost center. These rates are established
at the branch level. To these rates, indirect overhead, base
operations expense and G&A rates per direct labor hour are
added. Separate rates for these overhead categories are
established at directorate level; therefore, each productive
cost center within a directorate will have the same indirect
overhead, base operations expense and G&A rates as shown in
this example. The result is the cost application rates.
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The significance of these rates is that they are
the labor and overhead component used by Anniston when it
initially determines its unadjusted stabilized rates. For
example, if the man-hour standard for the overhaul of a piece
of equipment was two hours, the labor and overhead component
of the fixed price for the cost center on the left in Figure
III-2 would be two times $34.27 or $68.54. To this number
the material costs would be added and the result would be an
unadjusted fixed price per unit. This assumes only one cost
center was involved in the overhaul and there were no "other"
costs to be considered (e.g., travel). The man-hour stand-
ards used to multiply against the cost application rates are
locally prepared and are obtained from the work measurement
standards, the next topic of discussion.
e. Stabilized Rate Development Summarized
To develop a stabilized rate for a piece of
equipment, Anniston multiplies the cost application rates of
the individual cost centers by the manhour standard for each
cost center listed in the Depot Maintenance Work Requirement.
This yields the current cost of labor and overhead. A bill
of materials is developed for the piece of equipment using
the End Item Materiel Data Record. The cost of the bill of
materials is computed by multiplying the absolute amount of
materials by the current cost per unit (e.g., five pounds of
bolts times $1.00 per pound equals $5.00). By adding the
current cost of labor and overhead to the material cost per
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unit and any "other" cost, the fixed price per unit is deter-
mined. Anniston then submits this unadjusted stabilized rate
to DESCOM. A summary timeline for this process is presented
in the left side of Figure III-3. The right side of Figure
III-3 presents the remainder of the process.
The process that has been described is typical of
what one would expect to find in an accounting textbook de-
scribing standard cost. What has been described as a stabi-
lized rate is actually a variation on the standard costing
theme. A standard cost ". . . is the predetermined cost of
manufacturing a single unit or a number of product units dur-
ing a specific period in the immediate future. A standard
cost has two components: a standard and a cost." A stand-
ard must be thought of as a norm in terms of specific items,
such as pounds of materials, hours of labor required, and
percentage of plant capacity to be used." (Matz & Usry, 1984)
The process that Anniston goes through to arrive
at what is known as the unadjusted stabilized rate is exactly
what one would expect. The projected plant capacity usage is
defined by DESCOM. The standards that are used are the man-
hour standards and the bill of materials standards already
discussed. The last portion of the standard cost is the cost
application rate which expresses current hourly costs of
operations for a v/orkcenter. Consequently, when Anniston
compiles the unadjusted stabilized rate, the resultant figure
is an accurate representation of current costs.
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THE AIF BUDGET & STABILIZED RATE FORMULATION CYCLE
FY-2 FY-1 FY
IQ 2Q 3Q 4Q IQ 2Q 3Q 4Q IQ 2Q
COB: Command Operating Budget (the customers!
Note: Notice how the AIF budget, stabilized rates and customer
budgets are interdependent.
Figure 3-3
Source: Financial Management of the Army Industrial Fund
Figure III —3
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Although Anniston's unadjusted stabilized rate
represents current costs, the manipulations of the stabilized
rates by DESCOM changes the stabilized rates by such a degree
that they no longer reflect the projected costs of opera-
tions. As a consequence, what is known as the adjusted
stabilized rates (the ones Anniston bills customers with)
are not intended to reflect the costs of operations at
Anniston. The reasons for and the methods to achieve this
are explained below.
f. The Stabilized Rate Validation Process
Once Anniston has arrived at an unadjusted fixed
price for some item (e.g., a widget), the price then goes
through a six step validation process. The six steps are:
(1) the primary cost elements are identified, (2) the sources
are documented, (3) man-hour standards are checked for cur-
rency, (4) the rates are put in the prescribed formats, (5)
the math is verified, and (6) the narratives are are reviewed
for logic. The Directorate for Resource Management is re-
sponsible for the verification process. These actions are
after the Production Planning and Control Division of the
Maintenance Directorate has prepared, documented and inter-
nally validated the rates. An explanation of the six steps
follows
:
(1) Primary cost elements are identified: from the per-
spective of the entire fixed price per unit, indivi-
dual cost items are broken out that exceed ten percent
of the total price.
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(2) Sources documented: the sources for the four main
components of fixed prices are individually identi-
fied :
Direct labor: rate standards file and man-hour
standards file
Overhead: man-hour standards and overhead rates
Materials: EIMDR (based on consumption)
Other: EIMDR
(3) Current man-hour standards: current man-hour stan-
dards are the key in the determination of many fixed
price computations. Accordingly, the standards used
on the 980 form (fixed price development sheet) are
verified against the EIMDR.
(4) Data in prescribed format: essentially an adminis-
trative check to ensure that the fixed prices are in
the proper format and on the proper forms for sub-
mission to DESCOM.
(5) Math is correct: self-explanatory
(6) Narratives are logical: narratives are most often
used when non-standard data sources are used in rate
formulation, (e.g., new DMWR, new or updated mortality
data, line item not previously repaired.) (Anniston,
no date)
The remaining discussion in this chapter address-
es the manipulations that the stabilized rates undergo once
they have been submitted to DESCOM by Anniston.
g. Stabilized Rate Validation to the Budget Mark
As a part of DESCOM' s validation process, the in-
dividual fixed prices times program quantities are summarized
to reflect the following factors: (1) direct labor, material
and other are combined to a category called direct expenses
per direct labor hour, (2) mission overhead per direct labor
hour, (3) base operations indirect expenses per direct labor
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hour, (4) general and administrative expenses per direct
labor hour, (5) NOR, and (6) fixed price per direct labor
hour. The above costs are summarized and the ratios of each
category of costs to direct labor hour are taken because it
is these ratios that form the basis of the budget, not abso-
lute dollars. The guideline for spending is the ratio of the
expense category to direct labor hours, not a dollar total.
For example, if direct labor hours are below the budget dol-
lar total and total direct expenses are also below the budget
dollar total, that does not mean that there are excess funds
in the direct expenses category which are un.committed (e.g.,
available for spending). The budget is expressed in terms of
direct expenses, mission overhead, etc. per direct labor hour
and not X dollars for direct labor and Y dollars for over-
head. (DESCOM, 1985) All six expense areas are categoric-
ally compared to the budget mark with the exception of fixed
price per direct labor hour--that is compared to net revenue
per direct labor hour (a DESCOM term to be discussed later).
Once the factors are compared with the approved budget mark
necessary adjustments are made to ensure that the budgeted
fixed prices conform to the rates reflected in the AIF budget
in order to arrive at the adjusted fixed price. This is not,




h. DESCOM Adjustments to the Stabilized Rates
DESCOM applies five categories of adjustments to
the unadjusted rates submitted by the depots. They are: (1)
inflation, (2) productivity gains, (3) foreseen production
changes for the target year during the rate formulation time
period, (4) the Asset Capitalization Program, and (5) NOR.
Four of the adjustment categories have already been address-
ed. The fifth, the Asset Capitalization Program (ACP) is a
surcharge added to the stabilized rates to raise revenue to
fund capital equipment at the depots. Although a specific
depot's contribution to the program. is gauged by its output,
the disbursements of the funds are at the discretion of
DESCOM. Consequently, no relationship exists between the
amount of funds generated by a depot and the amount of ACP
monies that depot will receive for capital projects. The
Asset Capitalization Program surcharge is included in the NOR
adjustment of the final stabilized rates used to bill custom-
ers. For example, the NOR for FY87 is a positive $8.00 per
direct labor hour. The Asset Capitalization Program sur-
charge contained within the $8.00 is approximately $3.50.
(Lewis, 1985)
Net Revenue is a DESCOM term which is the sum of
revenue and the change in work-in-process. Net revenue is
used as a DESCOM level management tool because expenses and
earned revenue are adjusted by the change in work-in-process
when determining the NOR. Actual revenue is not earned until
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a product is completed; however, the change in work-in-
process is treated as quasi-revenue for NOR computation pur-
poses. "When comparing to direct labor hours, net revenue is
an excellent management tool and, hence, the net revenue per
direct labor hour is used in the budget" (DESCOM, 1985). Net
revenue has another purpose in that net revenue per direct
labor hour is the primary tool used by DESCOM to tie the AIF
budget to the appropriated funds budgets. After the AIF
budget has been formulated, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) determines the final changes, if any, to sta-
bilized rates. For example, based on OSD decisions for the
FY86 DESCOM AIF budget, the overall rate for net revenue per
direct labor hour changed from FY85 by minus 13 percent for
maintenance and minus 10 percent for supply.
The AIF budget itself is a 200 plus page document
which has backup and supporting documentation. The core of
the budget is the "A" and "IF" statements. The AIF budget
mark is an extraction of these statements into a series of
key management indicators: (1) man-years, (2) direct labor
hours, (3) direct expenses per direct labor hours, (4) over-
head expenses, (5) total expenses per direct labor hours, (6)
net revenue per direct labor hours, and (7) NOR (net revenue
minus total expenses).
Figure III-4 represents the fixed price for re-
ceiving a ton of AMMO which was submitted by a depot to




DEPOT SUBMISSION OF FY86 FIXED PRICE
APRIL 1984




DIRECT 2.11 hrs X $6.36 = $13.43
INDIRECT 2.11 hrs X $3.64 = $ 7.69
BASE OPS 2.11 hrs X $7.17 = $15.12
G&A 2.11 hrs X $1.06 = $ 2.25
TOTAL EXPENSES $67.52
NOR
TOTAL FIXED PRICE $67.52
Figure III-4
Source: Financial Management of the Army Industrial Fund
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was 2.11 hours to receive one ton of ammunition. The actual
documentation provided by the depot identified the hours in
each work center involved and by multiplying the labor rate
for each work center the direct labor cost was determined.
For illustrative purposes, the labor rate for the involved
cost centers has been averaged to the $13.76 shown in Figure
III-4. The $13.76 represents the average actual labor rates
being used by the involved cost centers in FY 84 when this
estimate was made. In this example, there are no material or
other direct costs to consider since the example is from the
Supply Directorate. The 2.11 hours were multiplied by the
direct overhead, indirect overhead, base operations expense
and general and administrative rates as shown to determine
the total expenses per ton. The depot does not add the NOR
factor since it is determined at DESCOM as the budget is
being developed.
At the same time the depots are developing their
input to the fixed prices, the depots are negotiating their
budgets with DESCOM. Once the budgets are finalized, the
rates per hour submitted by the depots are adjusted to con-
form to the budget and a NOR per hour is added (either posi-
tive or negative). The increases to the rate in Figure III-5
reflect the inflation adjustments approved by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. The depots submit their prices in
current dollars and the four percent increase in the ex-
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DIRECT 2.11 hrs X $7.02 = $14.81
INDIRECT 2.11 hrs X $4.01 = $ 8.46
BASE OPS 2.11 hrs X $6.73 = $14.21
G&A 2.11 hrs X $1.04 = $ 2.19
TOTAL EXPENSES $70.24
NOR 2.11 hrs X $-1.14 = $-2.41
TOTAL FIXED PRICE $67.83
Figure III-5
Source: Financial Management of the Army Industrial Fund
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The $1.14 per hour negative NOR adjustment was the same for
all supply mission stabilized rates throughout DESCOM. All
maintenance stabilized rates also receive universal NOR
adjustment.
The AIF budget cycle continues by using the depot
budgets mentioned in the previous paragraph. The depots sub-
mit formal AIF budgets which tie back to the previously
approved, individually negotiated budgets. DESCOM consol-
idates these budgets and makes necessary adjustments for
Program Budget Guidance (PBG) changes and other known changes
contained in the customers' Command .Operating Budget (COB).
Following the submission of the AIF budget, further adjust-
ments are made as a part of the Program Budget Decision as
the Federal budgeting system continues. Meanwhile, the
depots begin the Internal Operating Budget process in anti-
cipation of beginning the upcoming fiscal year.
Once the presidential budget is submitted, DESCOM
receives the final Program Budget Decision (PBD) markup of
the AIF budget. Based on this markup, the AIF budget is
adjusted and the fixed prices and rates are adjusted accord-
ingly and used as the final approved stabilized rates in the
current year column of the next Command Operating Budget.
The adjustment is an across the board percentage adjustment
(if required) to maintain the balance of funds mentioned in
the previous paragraph. The final stabilized rates that will
be used for billing purposes throughout the fiscal year are
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given to the depots two to three months before the start of a
fiscal year. Figure III-6 demonstrates how the adjustments
are made.
The Program Budget Decision adjustments are made
to the expenses, revenue, and labor hours of the AIF budget'
and the depots budgets are adjusted accordingly. Once the
adjustments are made to the depots' budgets, the fixed prices
for the budget year are again adjusted to agree to each de-
pot ' s budget.
Figure III-6 demonstrates the changes that were
made to the FY86 price previously submitted by a depot. That
price was $67.83 per ton; however, Program Budget Decision
adjustments such as the five percent pay reduction caused the
expensing levels to decrease. (Note: The five percent salary
reduction was based upon a comment made by President Reagan
that he desired to see Federal civilian wages trimmed by five
percent to help alleviate the Federal budget deficits. Of
course, this has not transpired but the comment found itself
embodied in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
(PPBS) throughout the Department of Defense (Tase, 1985).)
After all expensing rate adjustments were made, the necessary
NOR was determined which would achieve an overall supply mis-
sion rate decrease of ten percent from FY85 as directed by
PBD 408C. The result was a $2.17 per hour loss. Therefore,




PBD ADJUSTMENT OF FY86 FIXED PRICE
APRIL 1985




DIRECT 2.11 hrs X $6.62 = $13.96
INDIRECT 2.11 hrs X $3.78 = $ 7.98
BASE OPS 2.11 hrs X $5.65 = $11.93
G&A 2.11 hrs X $1.03 = $ 2.17
TOTAL EXPENSES $64.3 3
NOR 2.11 hrs X $-2.17 = $-4.58
TOTAL FIXED PRICE $59.75
Figure III-6
Source: Financial Management of the Army Industrial Fund
price per unit, $59.75 will be earned for each ton of ammu-
nition received.
i. Stabilized Rate Revision
As events transpire during the year numerous as-
sumptions that were made during the stabilized rate formula-
tion process may prove to be in error. The most common areas
of concern are civilian wages, inflation, scope of work and
enhanced depot capability. The greater the assumptions
change the less the stabilized rates reflect Anniston's
costs. For example, assume that the tanks from a particular
customer require extensive corrosion treatment and that the
treatment requires a significant increase in man-hours.
Since the corrosion has just been discovered an allowance
for the work does not exist in the Depot Maintenance Work
Requirement. Consequently, the costs associated with the
abnormal corrosion treatment were not included in the sta-
bilized rate. Is a process available that will allow An-
niston to revise the rate? Theoretically the answer is yes.
But, as a practical matter the answer is no. It is possible
for Anniston to obtain a revised rate from DESCOM but it
almost never happens. For unforeseen expenses DESCOM prefers
the use of what is known as "pass throughs" . A pass through
is a supplemental appropriation obtair.ee. from Congress that
DESCOM subdivides between the depots. This is also a rare
occurrence. \- a prnet Lca3 matter, Anniston is unable to re-
vise the rate;; either unwards or e.owrua ru s k as o s- happens
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due to efficiencies associated with capital expenditures).
(Monroe, 1985)
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has described DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H, the
Uniform Cost Accounting system and stabilized rates. The
Uniform Cost Accounting system and the instruction deal
with actual costs. As has been demonstrated, although a
stabilized rate begins with actual costs, the adjusted rate
that Anniston uses for billing may or may not be represen-
tative of the actual costs of repair. Since the purpose of
stabilized rates is customer convenience, one should not
expect them to mirror depot costs. Afterall, that was not
their intention. In the next chapter Anniston' s cost accu-
mulation process is discussed and Anniston ' s actual costs are
compared to those obtained from the Uniform Cost Accounting
system (the instruction).
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IV. COSTING DATA ACCUMULATION AND COMPARISON
The reporting requirements of DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H
were presented in the previous chapter. This chapter pre-
sents Anniston Army Depot's cost accumulation procedures and
the procedures used to satisfy the reporting requirements of
the instruction. Lastly, this chapter attempts to compare
actual cost data obtained from Anniston with data generated
by the reporting system as required by the instruction.
Theoretically, one would expect to find similar cost data
obtained from the two sources. Even if the numbers are not
identical, it should be possible to explain the variances.
As a reminder to the reader, stabilized rates are for billing
purposes only, this chapter deals with "actual" costs.
A. COST ACCUMULATION
1 . Direct and Indirect Labor
Direct and indirect labor hours are tracked daily by
individual workcenters by means of a Labor and Production
card. (The card itself is similar to the IBM punch card.)
The cards contain the prepunched name, social security num-
ber, and workcenter of each employee. The workcenter super-
visor manually fills out the labor and production cards
listing the employee's time, JO/PCN, and the specific work
performed using a four digit operations code. Unless the
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employee spent the entire eight hours performing the same
task on a single JO/PCN, more than one task and/or JO/PCN
will be listed. Of course, not all of the employees' time is
productive. For example, some time may be spent in training
or some time may be idle (e.g., awaiting an inspector). Non-
productive time is identified on the Labor and Production
card and reported as such. Cards are also submitted for ab-
sent personnel (e.g., on vacation or sick). Each work cen-
ter supervisor submits the Labor and Production cards to a
production clerk who then collates them for the branch. The
Labor and Production cards are then submitted to the Direc-
torate for Information Management for processing. (Wood,
1985)
As indicated, labor costs are identified (as are all
costs) with a JO/PCN which is in turn tied back to a Procure-
ment Requisition Order Number (PRON) issued by the Army Ma-
teriel Command. Both the JO/PCN and the PRON usually contain
more than one unit. For example, one PRON may contain num-
erous tanks. Consequently, no provisions are made for iden-
tifying the costs of an individual unit or a component of
an individual unit (e.g., the engine of a tank undergoing
overhaul )
.
A courier for the Information Management Directorate
"makes the rounds" picking up the Labor and Production cards
for all workcenters. The data are then entered into computer
via keyboard to tape and batch processed. A validity check
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is then run against the data (e.g., Are all eight hours of an
employee's time identified? Are JO/PCNs valid?). The com-
puter contains the personnel files of depot employees, their
workcenter, and their wage rates. If a discrepancy arises
the questionable Labor and Production card is returned to the
branch administrative center for corrective action. The
validated daily labor information is then posted to payroll,
to the JO/PCN account, and to the Program Summary Report.
The application of labor charges to the Program Summary
Report is addressed below. (Stephens, 1985)
2 . Material
As units (e.g., tanks, M-16s) are inducted into Anni-
iston for repair, an automated check is performed against the
Depot Maintenance Work Requirement to determine the necessary
repair operations and the bill of materials. By identifying
the repair operations, the requisite workcenters are also
identified. This is done because material is issued against
both a JO/PCN and a workcenter. As the Supply Directorate
issues material to the Maintenance Directorate, the material
charges and workcenter identification are posted to the
authorizing JO/PCN. The prices charged to customers for ma-
terial are those prices contained in the Army's master in-
ventory pricing catalog. Consequently, price updates occur
annually. At the same time the charges are posted to JO/
PCNs, the computer posts identical charges to the PRONs asso-
ciated with their respective JO/PCNs. These charges will
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then be reflected in the Program Summary Report. Unused
material is returned to the Supply Directorate and the appro-
priate accounts are credited. (Johnson, 1985)
3. Overhead
Although this subsection is labeled overhead, the
application of overhead expenses to a JO/PCN and subsequent
PRON is more involved than simply adding a rate for G&A per
direct labor hour. The costing rate used by Anniston to
recover overhead expenses is actually a standard cost and
includes direct labor, indirect labor, direct and indirect
overhead, base operations expense, G&A, electric and all
other utilities. The only charges not included are direct
material and direct other. (Johnson, 1985)
The Program and Budget Division of the Directorate
for Resource Management prepares the standard costs by direc-
torate for the depot (each directorate has its own expensing
rate) . The standard cost that is determined by the Program
and Budget Division is considered valid for one year and is
updated annually. When the computer posts labor and overhead
costs to a JO/PCN it is done by multiplying the number of
direct labor hours by the directorates' standard cost amount.
For example, the Maintenance Directorate is currently using
$31.00 as its standard cost. If a job took 10 direct _labor
hours and five indirect labor hours to complete, the costs
charged against the JO/PCN would be 10 X $31.00 or $310.00.
The only additional costs that could be charged to that
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JO/PCN would be direct material and direct other. The vari-
ances that inevitably accompany a standard cost system are
closed to the equivalent of an income statement at the end of
the year. (Johnson, 1985)
B. COST REPORTING AS PER DOD INSTRUCTION 7220. 29-H
Anniston, as do all Army depots, operates under the Stan-
dard Depot System. The system, instituted by DESCOM, is a
comprehensive operations and financial techniques directive
which includes, among other things, depot reporting require-
ments. The required reports are transmitted to DESCOM'
s
computer via land-line from the Directorate for Information
Management. The report germane to this discussion is the
Program Summary Report which is a costing report that is sub-
mitted weekly. DESCOM, in turn, "picks off" the requisite
numbers from the Program Status Reports quarterly and submits
the yearly report to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense as required by DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H (Solen-
berger, 1985). An example of the Program Status Report is
presented in Appendix C. Although the personnel of Anniston
are aware of the Uniform Cost Accounting system, they have no
knowledge of the reporting requirements of the instruction
(Holmes, 1985). This author believes, however, that that
observation is immaterial since Anniston' s reporting require-
ments are defined by the Standard Depot System.
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C. COMPARISON OF COST DATA OBTAINED FROM ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT
WITH DOD INSTRUCTION 7220. 29-H GENERATED DATA
It was the author's intention to compare four years' of
4.
data that were obtained from Anniston with the data obtained
through the Uniform Cost Accounting system. Ostensibly, if
the Uniform Cost Accounting system represents the financial
activities of Anniston, then one would expect the numbers to
be alike, or at least very similar. If the numbers are not
identical, it should be possible to explain the variances.
Unfortunately, that task proved much more difficult than
anticipated. The 7220 data were obtained from Mr. Alex
Sinaiko, Defense Manpower Data Center ( DMDC ) . The data from
Anniston were obtained from Mr. Marshall Crow, Production
Controller. The question that was asked at both locations
was, "What were the costs of the inspection and repair of the
M60A3 at Anniston Army Depot in FYs 81-84?" A comparison of
the data for fiscal years 81-84 is presented. The data from
the two sources are presented in Tables IV-2 and IV-2 respec-
tively. The data from the two sources are in different for-
mats. Anniston' s data are significant to two decimal places
while DMDC ' s data have been rounded to thousands of dollars.
As can be observed from the two tables, the methods of cost
presentation are also different. Table IV-1 presents costs
by cost category (e.g., labor, material, G&A) while Anniston
presents the unit average of the repair in terms of man-hours
and costs per unit. Even though the data are in different
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TABLE IV-1. DATA OBTAINED FROM DMDC ^$000)
LABOR
HOURS DIRECT DIRECT OTHER PROD
FY (000) LABOR MAT ' L DIRECT INDIRECT G&A TOTAL CONVERS
81 7 87 20 - 91
82 13 159 82 4 177
83 146 1,835 214 40 2,252































formats, if the 7220 data are representative of the repairs
undertaken by Anniston during the specified time period, then
with minimal manipulation it should be possible to verify
Anniston' s figures using Table IV-1.
However, it is not possible to compare direct labor, dir-
ect material, other direct, production indirect and G&A
expenses with the Anniston data since the formats are differ-
ent. Regardless, it should be possible to compare actual
labor hours, total cost and conversion cost since both tables
list those categories. (Conversion cost refer to those costs
specifically identified with converting a M60A1 into a
M60A3.) Let us now look at those categories of costs.
The labor hours are listed directly in Table IV-1. How-
ever, to obtain labor hours from Table IV-2 it is necessary
to multiply the quantity by the unit average for the inspec-
tion and repair process and also for the conversion process.
For example, the 24,000 conversion labor hours for FY 81 was
obtained by multiplying the per unit standard (569) times
the quantity (43) and then rounding the result. The inspec-
tion/repair labor hours were figured similarly. The total
labor hours were figured by summing conversion and inspec-
tion/repair labor hours. A comparison of those numbers is
presented in Table IV-3. The data from Anniston were broken
down into three categories in the hopes of finding some cor-







TABLE IV-3. COMPARISON OF LABOR HOURS (000)
Data from DMDC Data from Anniston Conver-





one would expect to find similar numbers from the two
sources. Unfortunately, this author is unable to find any
correlation between the labor hours produced by Anniston and
those produced by DMDC. With the information obtained during
the course of this research effort, the author is not in a
position to offer an explanation for the variance in labor
hours. The answer may lie in the transformation process,
which was briefly discussed earlier in this chapter, that
occurs at DESCOM. Further research is recommended to find
the answer to this question.
A similar comparison is presented on total costs and con-
version costs in Table IV-4. Although the total column data
are grossly mismatched, the dollar costs for conversion are
similar in FY's 83 and 84. There is only $1,000 variance out
of a total of $5 million between DMDC and Anniston for FY 84.
For all practical purposes the numbers can be assumed to be
the same since the $1,000 variance (.02%) can easily be
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TABLE IV-4. COMPARISON OF COSTS (000)
Data f^om DMDC Data From Anniston
FY Total Conversion Total Conversi
81 210 174 3,891 478
82 436 233 38,408 3,505
83 4,503 4,130 48,140 4,455
84 6, 101 5,035 44,571 5,034
explained by rounding error. The variance for FY 83 is
$325,000. Although in absolute terms the number is signi-
ficant, in relative terms the 7.3% variance does not approach
the level of the FY 81 or the FY 82 variances. The data for
FY's 82 and 81 are quite different and the variances and an
explanation for the variances has not been found. However, a
trend in the data does appear to be evident. The more cur-
rent data appears to be more closely correlated. Although
this author cannot offer a definite explanation, a change in
costs categorization and/or reporting procedures by Anniston,
DESCOM, or the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Logistics) is a plausible explanation. A
more mundane explanation may be that since the Uniform Cost
Accounting system was installed in FY 77, it simply took more
time to "work out the bugs". Further research is required to
accurately explain the variances.
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In summary, although ideally one would expect the numbers
that were obtained through the DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H
reporting s*ystem to be the same, or at least similar, to the
numbers obtained from Anniston if the system faithfully re-
presents transpired events. Unfortunately, with some excep-
tion, the data obtained through the 7220 system bear little
resemblance to the figures obtained from Anniston. Although
it is quite possible that the data this author obtained from
DMDC was not the answer to the question was asked. It is
also evident that without both the Anniston and DMDC data, a
decision maker would not be in a position to judge the
validity of the 7220 data. Therefore, he could unknowingly
make decisions based upon faulty data. The question remains,
how valid are 7220 data?
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
k
This chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis and
recommendations for further study. In the previous chapters,
three accounting systems have been presented: (1) Uniform
Cost Accounting, (2) stabilized rates, and (3) actual cost-
ing. In this chapter the three systems are looked at from
two different perspectives. First, conclusions are drawn
individually and, second, the three systems are collectively
viewed in light of a theoretical management control system.
The last section of this chapter presents recommendations for
further study.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions that are presented are for the three sys-
tems individually. The systems are presented in the follow-
ing order: (1) stabilized rates, (2) Uniform Cost Accounting,
and (3) actual costing.
1 . Stabilized Rates
Stabilized rates have achieved their primary objec-
tive of enhancing customer convenience by holding depot bill-
ing rates constant throughout the fiscal year. However, they
have done so at the expense of the Army Industrial Fund. The
reason for this is that the rates are not available in suffi-
cient time to allow the customers the use of the rates in the
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preparation of their budgets. In fact, stabilized rate de-
velopment and customer budget preparation parallel each
other. As was discussed in chapter t^hree, the stabilized
rates are finally adjusted and available for use approxi-
mately three months before the start of a fiscal year. Al-
though three months is sufficient for the depots to use the
rates for billing, it is not possible for the customers to
use the rates for budget preparation. By design, the Federal
budgeting system is a "bottom up" process. In order for the
stabilized rates to be of any use to the customers in their
budget preparations, they would have to be available more
than a year sooner.
Although the concept of stabilized rates and pro-
grammed gains/losses does not pose a conceptual problem for
the comptroller's staff, this author found that the workers,
middle, and senior level management dislike stabilized rates.
The most prevalent objection is essentially one of morale.
The sentiment that was expressed was if we are doing such a
good job, why are we losing so much money. For example, for
the first year that stabilized rates were in effect, Anniston
had a programmed loss of $5.6 million for tank repair alone.
It made no sense to the workers that, in spite of their best
efforts, the depot was losing money. Since the depot com-
manders have limited control over their expenses and (given
stabilized rates) essentially no control over their revenues,
there is a very real concern that stabilized rates have
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caused a reduction in management incentive (U. S. House of
Representatives, 1978). (Aside from productivity enhance-
ments and energy conservation measures the primary expense a
Commander has jurisdiction over is temporary employees. His
authorized manning level is established by Congress, the wage
scales of the civil servants are established by the Federal
government, and he must purchase his materials through the
Army supply system. ) While it is true that programmed losses
will be recouped in future years, it is also true that the
"true" cost of the repair has been shifted to a future appro-
priation and future customers.
The stabilized rates are subject to political mani-
pulation as a result of the industrial vs. appropriated
funds quagmire. Anniston originally submitted a per unit
price of $101,692 for the overhaul of the M60A1 tank.- How-
ever, subsequent to that submission Anniston was directed
to install a new "track shoe" on all M60A1 ' s (a scope of
work change). Accordingly, Anniston revised its price to
$113,650. Although this increase in materiel was acknow-
ledged throughout the command structure, Anniston was not
allowed to increase its stabilized rate. The Department of
the Army's decision to hold the unit cost of the M60A1 to
$91,144 in June of 1976 further compounded the situation.
Because the $91,144 figure was incorporated into the Army's
FY77 "plan" for major weapon items they would not approve
the change. The reason for their refusal was that it was
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necessary to retain the lower price in order to meet the
production goals used in the Operations and Maintenance
accounts budget planning. (U.S. House of Representatives,
1978) The result, the Department of the Army received the
number of tanks they desired, Anniston lost $22,506 per tank,
and the Industrial Fund absorbed the loss.
The rate stabilization process violates the very
premise upon which the Industrial Funds were established. As
established, the rates are almost totally inflexible.
The concept of a Government-run revolving fund (the depots)
is to provide a simulated private marketplace environment
where the fund manager is allowed sufficient flexibility
to exercise individual skill and initiative to satisfy
customer demand while conducting operations efficiently
on a break-even basis. The stabilization concept has
robbed the installation manager of some of his initiative
and clarity of goals. An activity manager can, and has
found himself in the incongruous position of striving to
meet production goals, cognizant all the while that each
unit being produced is being sold at a loss. (U.S. House
of Representatives, 1978)
As was stated in Chapter III, an objective of
stabilized rates is to aid customers in the preparation of
their budgets. However, stabilized rate formulation and
budget preparation actually parallel each other. Although
stabilized rates do shield the customer from price changes
during a year they are not available for budget formulation.
This results in budget abberations like the Anniston M60A1
example. Although it would be possible to prepare the rates
sooner, this author does not believe the depots would will-
ingly agree. As the situation now exits, the depots begin
98
rate development almost two years before the fiscal year and
because of the lead time only about 50 percent of the work-
load is identified. As was demonstrated in Chapter III,
workload determination is a significant factor in determining
stabilized rates. Increasing rate development lead time by
another year or more would make workload projection even more
tenuous. Besides, the further into the future you try to
predict, the more uncertainties you must deal with and the
less confidence you can place on the accuracy of your
figures
.
As a summary thought on stabilized rates, this
author has been told that the depots would prefer to be rid
of stabilized rates altogether, or at least operate with a
system incorporating a "flexible" stabilized rate that could
be updated during the fiscal year. This would allow the
depots to return to a breakeven mode of operation for the
desired management reasons already mentioned. A third alter-
native would be to adopt a system of rates based upon last
year's costs. These rates could be compiled quickly and
given to the customers for their budget preparations. The
Industrial Fund could continue to act as a financial shock
absorber as it does now.
2 . Uniform Cost Accounting
The DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H and the Uniform Cost
Accounting system have provided a workable vehicle for the
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achievement of their objectives. Specifically, the instruc-
tion has: (1) established a double-entry accrual based
accounting system, (2) established standards, policies and
definitions for uniform cost accounting, (3) identified cost
components by categories, and (4) established reporting
requirements. Each of the objectives stand alone on their
own merit, of that, there is no argument. However, the
reports that are supported by the reporting requirements are
of concern.
Chapter IV went into detail addressing the validity
of 7220 data. The conclusion that was reached was that al-
though two years' of cost data for one category of expenses
may be valid; there was no doubt that the other categories of
costs were useless for accurate decision making purposes.
Possible explanations for the variances and recommendations
for further study were presented at the end of chapter four.
The remainder of the discussion on the Uniform Cost Account-
ing system centers on the following concept—even if 7220
numbers are faithfully representative of the financial acti-
vities of the depots, what limitations must be observed when
interpreting and comparing the reports?
As discussed in Chapter III, the reporting system
described by DoD Instruction 7220. 29-H generates a variety of
financial reports. Accounting theory points out that the
decision makers using the reports desire a comparative anal-
ysis (Spiller and Gosman, 1984). As stated in Chapter III,
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an objective of the instruction states that the reports will
assist in productivity measurement, the development of per-
formance and cost standards and aid in determining areas for
management emphasis. However, it is very easy to misinter-
pret the reports and arrive at an erroneous conclusion. For
example, to gauge the financial health of a depot one would
look at year-end operating results (the NOR). Before sta-
bilized rates came into being a year-end NOR of zero was
ideal. Now, however, it is not obvious whether a five mil-
lion dollar loss is good or bad. Perhaps the depot was pro-
grammed for a six million dollar loss and due to productivity
enhancements undertaken by management the depot saved one
million dollars.
The comparison issue also affects decisions between
different depots. Intuitively, one would say that the depot
that made ten million dollars was more efficient than the
depot that made two million dollars. But as we now know,
that may not be true. For example, the NOR factor is applied
on the basis of direct labor hours; consequently, if the NOR
is negative a depot would show increasing losses with in-
creasing direct labor usage.
Another objective of the instruction states that the
reports ". . . will provide a means of identifying mainte-
nance capability, duplication of capacity and indicate both
actual and potential areas for interservice support of main-
tenance workload" . An obvious example of the use of the
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reports for this objective is to consolidate maintenance re-
pair at one or two depots. However, these decisions should
not be made on"the basis of reports generated by the instruc-
tion because:
(1) The labor component of the stabilized rates is by far
the largest single component and the labor rates paid
by the depots throughout the country are regionally
determined by the Federal Government and vary signifi-
cantly. Efficiency usually means that the same amount
of work was accomplished at reduced cost. But what of
the depot with a low wage scale whose man-hour stand-
ards are higher than the other depots. Does that mean
that the low wage scale depot is efficient because it
it can repair a piece of equipment less expensively
than the other depots? This author thinks not. If,
however, the low wage scale depot also reduced its'
man-hour standards through better management, then
yes, the low wage scale depot would then be more
efficient.
(2) For strategic military purposes it is desireable to
possess duplicate repair facilities for protection
against such contingencies as bombings and terrorists.
(3) Excess capacity is militarily desireable to provide
for surge capacity in the event of war.
(4) The reports do not show how many of a specific item
have been previously repaired by a depot. For ex-
ample, do the costs shown reflect two pieces of equip-
ment a year or two hundred (e.g., the learning curve
phenomenom)
.
3 . Actual Costing
Drawing conclusions from the material presented in
Chapter IV on Anniston's cost accumulation process, this
author believes that Anniston has an effective actual costing
system. In particular, labor management, labor expense
accounting procedures, and the automated material costing
procedures appear to be sound. Since Anniston uses standard
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costs to post actual costs on the Program Summary Report
(from which 7220 data is obtained), it would be interesting
to compare end of the year variances to determine the effec-
tiveness of using a single standard cost throughout the year.
4. Uniform Cost Accounting, Stabilized Rates, and
Actual Costing Compared
The three systems have been presented as though they
are three distinct entities. And in fact they are. Uniform
Cost Accounting primarily supports the Department of Defense
and Congressional decision-makers. Stabilized rates are
solely for the convenience of the customers and the actual
costing system is exclusively Anniston's. However, the three
systems are tied together by a common thread. At one point
in time, the three are actually one in the same, at least
theoretically and all three are driven by Anniston's actual
cost system. This will be explained by comparing the actual
cost system against both stabilized rates and the Uniform
Cost Accounting system.
As you will recall from Chapter III, the origin of
stabilized rates is Anniston's cost application rates. The
cost application rates are a product of Anniston's actual
cost system. When the unadjusted stabilized rate is deter-
mined at Anniston, it is the current actual cost. DESCOM
adjusts the stabilized rates for inflation, productivity
enhancements, the Asset Capitalization Program and NOR. The
NOR factor has been shown to vary from a few dollars negative
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to the current eight dollars positive. The adjusted stabi-
lized rates no longer reflect Anniston's actual costs, al-
though at one point in time they did. So, although the
components of stabilized rates and Anniston's actual cost
systems are similar, one would not expect stabilized rates to
equal Anniston's actual costs because of the NOR factor.
A similar phenomenon can be observed when comparing
Uniform Cost Accounting (specifically the reports generated
by the system) and Anniston's actual cost system. All of the
reports that are derived from the 7220 databank are obtained
through DESCOM via the Program Summary Report. As was dis-
cussed in Chapter IV, those costs are standard costs. The
standards are determined by Anniston's financial personnel
and the source of the standards is Anniston's actual cost
system. The same cost application rates that are used to
determine the unadjusted stabilized rates are used to deter-
mine the standard cost used on the Program Summary Report.
Theoretically, then, one would expect cost category totals
from the two systems to concur since they have the same
source. Unfortunately, as Chapter IV explained, that is NOT
the case.
B. UNIFORM COST ACCOUNTING, STABILIZED RATES AND THE ACTUAL
COST SYSTEM FROM A MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE
Implicit in the previous discussion is that the three
accounting systems are part of the mechanism by which the
organization ensures that resources are used effectively and
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efficiently; that is part of the management control system.
The management control activities within an organization
generally recur in a regular cycle and can be described by
these four phases: (1) programming, (2) budgeting, (3) op-
erating and measurement, and (4) reporting and analysis
(Anthony and Dearden, 1980). This discussion will continue
by briefly describing each phase and disussing the implica-




Programming is the process of deciding on the var-
ious programs that an organization will undertake and the
approximate amount of resources that are to be allocated tc
each program. (Anthony and Dearden, 1980). Neither stabi-
lized rates nor the actual cost system play a role in this
process. This phase is often referred to as strategic plan-
ning and that role is outside the scope of the depot com-
mander. The reports generated by the Uniform Cost Accounting
system could be used in this phase (e.g., DoD and Congress-
ional decision-makers).
2 Budgeting
A budget is a plan for an organization that is usu-
ally expressed in monetary terms that covers a specific time
period.
In the budgeting process each program is translated into
terms that correspond to the sphere of responsibility of
each manager who is charged with executing the program or
some part of it. Thus, although the plans are originally
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made in terms of individual programs, in the budgeting pro-
cess the plans are translated into terms of responsibility-
centers. (Anthony and Dearden, 1980)
Two of the systems play a role in this phase, stabilized rates
and the actual cost system.
When Anniston inducts a piece of equipment on a
fixed price contract, the authorized manhours and the author-
ized dollar amount is specified. The limitations (authorized
man-hours and dollars) in the contract are the guidelines for
the depot managers and the limitations are themselves a pro-
duct of stabilized rates.
The actual cost system plays an integral role in the
budgeting process. As was discussed in Chapter III, the
internal operating budget is the key financial tool used for
the budgeting and financial management of the depots. The
source of the internal operating budget is the actual cost
system.
3 . Operating and Measurement
During the period of actual operations, records are kept
of resources actually consumed (i.e., costs) and of reve-
nues actually earned. These records are structured so that
cost and revenue data are classified both by programs and
by responsibility centers. (Anthony and Dearden, 1980)
All three systems perform a function in this phase.
The stabilized rates determine the amount of reve-
nues that a depot will receive for a fixed price order or a
fixed rate per hour order. Although the depots do perform
some reimburseable work, the bulk of a depot's revenues is
determined by stabilized rates.
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The actual cost system performs the same function in
this phase through two roles: (1) the Program Summary Re-
port, and (2) the internal operating budget. The managers of
the Maintenance Directorate use the Program Summary Report to
guide their actions and to gauge their performance. The per-
sonnel in the Directorate for Resource Management, on the
other hand, use the internal operating budget for the same
purposes
.
4. Reporting and Analysis
The management control system serves as a communication
device. The information that is communicated consists of
both accounting and nonaccounting data, and of both data
generated within the organization and data about what is
happening in the environment outside the organization.
. . . Based on these formal reports, and also on infor-
mation received through informal communication channels,
managers may decide to change the plan as set forth in the
budget, and this leads to a new planning process. (Anthony
and Dearden, 1980)
The two systems that function in this phase are the Uniform
Cost Accounting system and the actual cost system. From a
perspective external to the depots, it would appear that all
reports pertaining to depot operations have the 7220 databank
as their origin. That is true. However, as has been dis-
cussed, the source of the 7220 data is the actual cost sys-
tem. The internal operating budget performs this function in
an internal and external role. The internal role has already
been described. The external function is served when the
monthly analysis of the variances (mentioned in Chapter III
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and Appendix B) contained within the internal operating bud-
get are submitted to DESCOM by the depot commander.
5 . Summary
It is one of the intents of a management control
system to help managers use resources efficiently and effec-
tively. It has been shown that stabilized rates play no role
in that regard. Although both the Uniform Cost Accounting
system and the actual cost system do aid managers in this
regard. However, since the Uniform Cost Accounting system
relies upon the actual cost system for its information, this
author concludes that the actual cost system is the primary
system that functions in the management control system
milieu
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The following are suggestions for additional research to
enhance the scope of this report:
(1).. Examine the feasibility of altering the stabilized
rate process to better accomodate the needs of both
the depots and the customers (e.g., "flexible rates").
(2).. What impact has stabilized rates had upon the solvency
of the Army Industrial Fund corpus? Is it a problem?
(3).. Using source documents, examine depot level cost data
by weapon system and compare that to DoD Instruction
7220. 29-H generated data for the same weapon system.
Are they the same? If not, why are they different?
] OS
APPENDIX A
DoD INSTRUCTION 72 20. 29-H MAGNETIC TAPE LAYOUT
Field Tape
No. Description of Data Positions
Record Identification
1 Record Type "F" 1
2 Quarter Code 2
3 Fiscal Year 3-4
Identification of Facility
4 Program Element 5-10
5 Facility Name or Code 11-24
a. Organic Activity Name 11-24
b. Contractor Activity Code 11-22
6 Inside or Outside U. S. Code 25
7 Owner/Operator Code 26
8 Reporting Facility Code 27-31
Identification of Item/Service and Customer
9 Item Identification Number 32-44
10 Item Nomenclature 45-64
11 Standard Inventory Price 65-74
12 Weapon or Support System Code 75-78
13 Work Breakdown Structure Code 79-81
14 Work Performance Category 82-84









































Direct Material Cost - Funded
Direct Material Cost - Unfunded
(Investment Items at Full Price)
Direct Material Cost - Unfunded (Exchanges)
Direct Material Cost - Unfunded
(Modification Kits)
Direct Material Cost - Unfunded (Expense)
Other Direct Cost - Funded
Other Direct Cost - Unfunded
Operations Overhead - Funded
Operations Overhead - Unfunded
General and Administrative Expense -
Funded


































41 Government-Furnished Services - Funded 279-286
42 Government-Furnished Services - Unfunded 287-294
43 Maintenance Support Costs Organic - Funded 295-302
44 Maintenance Support Costs Organic - Unfunded 303-310
Production Data
45 Total Production Quantity Completed 311-318
46 Unused
47 Quantity of Completed Items Inducted
During Reporting Year 327-334
48 Quantity of Completed Items Inducted
During Year Preceding Reporting Year 335-342
49 Quantity of Completed Items Inducted
During All Other Previous Years 343-350
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FINANCIAL STATUS REPORT NARRATIVE
31 MAY 1985
PART I - DEVIATION IN EXCESS OF 5% TO FORECAST
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
ORDERS RECEIVED 17,502 6.5
EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS THE RESULT OF HQDESCOM ACCELERATION
OF OBLIGATIONS AGAINST PLAN.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
REVENUE 6,603 3.1
EXPLANATION: FAVORABLE VARIANCE HAS OCCURRED MAINLY IN THE
SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE MISSIONS AT ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT AND IS
WITHIN TOLERANCE.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
COST OF GOODS (7,421) (3.6)
PRODUCED
EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS WITHIN TOLERANCE BUT IS DISCUSSED
BELOW AT DETAIL LEVELS.





EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS WITHIN TOLERANCE.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
SALARIES & WAGES (882) (1.5)
EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS WITHIN TOLERANCE.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
OTHER (1,077) (1.5)
EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS WITHIN TOLERANCE.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
PRODUCTION OVERHEAD (4,850) (7.1)
COSTS
EXPLANATION: FAVORABLE VARIANCE IS EXPLAINED BELOW.








EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS WITHIN TOLERANCE. OVERAGE OF $299














($4,421) MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES
(585) CONTRACTS AND UTILITIES





SHORTFALL IN MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES HAS OCCURRED FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS: (1) PLAN INCLUDED OVERHEAD SUPPLIES FOR
APPROX 78 SGT YORK DIVAD VEHICLES THAT HAVE BEEN DECREASED
FOR A TOTAL PROGRAM OF 117 AND SCOPE OF WORK CHANGE ON 3 5 OF
100 M48A5 PAKISTAN VEHICLES WHICH WERE IN A SUPPLY SERVICE-
ABLE CONDITION WHICH REQUIRED ONLY MINOR REPAIR AND MINOR
OVERHEAD SUPPLIES. (2) AN INFLATION FACTOR OF 5% WAS
INCLUDED FOR FY85. THE OVERALL AVERAGE PROCE INCREASE FROM
STOCK FUND EFFECTIVE 1 OCT WAS ONLY 1.5%. THIS IS APPROX
$508 SHORTFALL. (3) A STUDY TO OPTIMIZE PARTS/SUPPLY USAGE
(DSTOP) INITIATIVES HAS IMPROVED INCREMENTAL TURN IN'S TO THE
EXTENT THAT CHARGES TO CLOSED JOBS WHICH ARE CHARGED TO OVER-
HEAD HAVE DECREASED BY $627 TO THAT PROGRAMMED. (4) DUE TO
PDO SHIPMENT FREEZE, $1.5 MIL IS ON HOLD FOR SHIPMENT TO PDO.
THE MAJORITY WILL BE CHARGEABLE TO MAINTENANCE OVERHEAD WHEN
FREEZE IS LIFTED AND SLIPPAGE WILL BE RECOUPED. (5) SLIPPAGE
IN SUPPLY IS ALSO ATTRIBUTED TO THE REDUCTION OF PACKING
MATERIAL FOR TANK CONVERSION KITJS. (6) VARIANCE OF $585 IN
BASE OPRS IS SLIPPAGE FOR UTILITIES AND CONTRACTS THAT ARE
PROGRAMMED TO BE RECOUPED.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION
GENERAL ADMIN COSTS (612)
DEVIATION
(7.4)
EXPLANATION SEE THE FOLLOWING
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LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
SALARIES & WAGES (324) (5.7)
EXPLANATION: SLIPPAGE OF $201 IS THE RESULT OF ADP AT LBDA
PROGRAMMED AS GAE IN THE MARK. A CHANGE IN THE STANDARD
DEPOT SYSTEM ALLOWED ADP COST TO BE DISTRIBUTED AS BOCIE AND
IS OFFSET IN PRODUCTION OVERHEAD SALARIES ABOVE. THIS
VARIANCE WILL NOT BE RECOUPED AND WILL CONTINUE TO GROW.
SLIPPAGE OF APPROX $123 IS AT LBDA WHERE PEOPLE WERE
PROGRAMMED TO WORK IN GAE BUT WERE REQUIRED ON HIGHER
PRIORITY WORK IN THE BOCIE AREA.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
OTHER (288) (10.9)
EXPLANATION: THE VARIANCE IS MAINLY THE RESULT OF LBDA ADP
CO ST PROGRAMMED IN MARK AS GAE INSTEAD OF BOCIE AND (RPMA)
DEPRECIATION PROGRAMMED AS GAE WITH COST BEING INCURRED AS
BOCIE. THIS IS THE RESULT OF THE SAME SDS CHANGE MENTIONED
ABOVE FOR ADP.
PLAN ACTUAL
OVERHEAD LABOR VERSUS DIRECT LABOR RATES
DIRECT SALARIES AND WAGES 57,194 56,312
OVERHEAD SALARIES AND WAGES 47,93 7 48,549
PRODUCTION 42,256 43,192
GEN ADM 5,681 5,357
OVERHEAD LABOR RATIO TO DIRECT 83.8 . 86.2
ACTUAL OVERHEAD RATIO IS 2.4 OR 2.9% MORE THAN PLAN AND WITH-
IN TOLERANCE. RATIO IS MORE AS THE RESULT OF DIRECT LABOR
SHORTFALL TO PLAN OF $882 OR 1.5% AND OVERHEAD EXCEEDING PLAN
BY $612 OR 1.3%.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
NET OPERATING RESULTS 16,966 113.9
EXPLANATION: FAVORABLE VARIANCE IS MAINLY IN THE FOLLOWING
AREAS
:
(1) A PROFIT OF $2,939 HAS OCCURRED IN THE INVENTORY
ACCOUNTS. A SMALL PROFIT OF $259 WAS ESTIMATED RESULTING IN
A PROFIT VARIANCE OF $2,680. PURCHASES AT STANDARD EXCEEDED
PURCHASES AT COST BY $1,298. THE CUSTOMER RETURNS W/0 CREDIT
EXCEEDED THE DISPOSITION OF MATERIEL W/0 CREDIT MAINLY DUE TO
THE FREEZE ON TRFS TO PDO. POTENTIAL EXCESSES ON HOLD TO BE
SHIPPED TO PDO IS $1,472.
(2) PROFIT VARIANCE OF $3,142 HAS OCCURRED IN OVERHEAD.
INCURRED OVERHEAD (PRODUCTION PLUS GEN ADM) IS $5,462 LESS
THAN PLANNED AS REFLECTED ABOVE. APPLIED OVERHEAD IS LESS
THAN PROGRAM AS THE RESULT OF SHORTFALL IN HOURS FOR RATE
APPLICATION. OVERHEAD SLIPPAGE AND PROFIT VARIANCE OF $1.5
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MIL WILL BE RECOUPED WHEN FREEZE ON SHIPMENTS TO PDO IS
LIFTED. THERE IS $1.5 MIL ON HOLD FOR SHIPMENT TO PDO.
OVERHEAD RATES HAVE BEEN DECREASED TWICE AND WILL BE DE-
CREASED AGAIN ON 1 JUL 85 BUT DECREASE IN OVERHEAD RATES WILL
GENERATE A PROFIT IN FIXED PRICES AND RATES.
(3) THE REMAINING PROFIT VARIANCE OF $11,144 HAS OCCURRED
MAINLY IN FIXED PRICE VARIANCES AT ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT. A
PROFIT OF $1,871 AND $1,743 HAS OCCURRED IN PE 721111 AMMO
AND OTHER SUPPLIES RESPECTIVELY. A COMBINATION OF FACTORS
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROFIT: (A) PROFIT IN AMMO CHEMICAL
WORKLOAD HAS DEVELOPED RESULTING FROM INCREASED CHEMICAL
WORKLOAD WHICH INCREASED THE DIRECT MANHOUR BASE. FIXED RATE
WAS BASED ON A SMALL KNOWN MANHOUR BASE WHICH HAS DOUBLED.
(B) AMMO SHIPPING AND RECEIVING ACTUAL WORKLOAD HAS EXCEEDED
FORECAST BY 5.9 AND 11.7 TONS RESPECTIVELY AT 3 1 MAY. (C)
PROFIT IN BOTH AMMO AND OTHER SUPPLIES HAS ACCURED DUE TO
DECREASED SUPPLIES AND MATERIEL EXPENSE TO THAT INCLUDED IN
FIXED PRICES AND RATES. INFLATION DID NOT DEVELOP AND
MATERIEL REQUIRED TO PACK TANK CONVERSION KITS DECREASED.
BALANCE OF THE PROFIT VARIANCE HAS OCCURRED IN MAINTENANCE
DUE TO FOLLOWING: (A) PARTS AND MATERIAL INFLATION HAS NOT
OCCURRED AS PROVIDED IN FIXED PRICES, (B) INCREASED AWARENESS
AND CONCERTED EFFORTS BY MANAGEMENT TO REDUCE COSTS, (C)
OPTIMIZE PARTS/SUPPLY USAGE AND, (4) IMPLEMENTATION OF
RECLAMATION INITIATIVES AND PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN ITEMS.
DETAIL ANALYSIS FOR SELECTED MAINTENANCE PRONS FOLLOW:
PRON NOMENCLATURE FY85 PROFIT
EH4CE247 ENGINE 1790-2C $1,297
EH5CE247 ENGINE 1790-2C 1,629
TOTAL $3,828
MAJOR PORTION OF PROFIT, APPROX 77%, IS THE RESULT OF
IMPROVED PARTS MANAGEMENT THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF DSTOPS
STUDY WHICH EDUCATED PLANNERS AND PARTS ATTENDANTS THROUGH
CLASSROOM TRAINING AND INCREASED AWARENESS AND EFFORTS TO
REDUCE COSTS. IN ADDITION, PARTS ARE LESS EXPENSIVE BY
INDIVIDUAL FSN THAN BY PROCUREMENT OF THE MORE EXPENSIVE
MITCHELL KIT. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN AMENDED TO PROCURE ONLY 1
PER MONTH IN LIEU OF 2 AND PROCUREMENT IS NOT RETROACTIVE IF
KITS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. APPROX 5% IS THE RESULT OF
INITIATIVES TO SCRUB MANHOUR STANDARD (FROM 312.4 TO 290.7).
THE FY85 PROGRAM IS IN PROCESS OF RENEGOTIATION DUE TO ABOVE
INITIATIVES BUT PROFIT WILL STILL BE REALIZED FROM THE FY84




EH5CW922 TANK COMBAT, M60A1/A3 $4,073
THIS IS CAT II FIXED PRICE PROGRAM AND IS SUBJECT TO NEGOTIA-
TION AT 50% COMPLETION. DEGREASE IN UNIT PRICE WILL BE
NEGOTIATED. PROFIT IS FROM LABOR, MATERIAL AND NOR
SURCHARGE. A MOA BETWEEN ANAD MAINTENANCE AND QUALITY
ESTABLISHED A NEW ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE AFFECTING ENGINES AND
TRANSMISSIONS FROM INSPECT AND REPAIR ( EFF 15 AUG 84).
PROCEDURE RESULTED IN TESTING THE POWER PACK AS A UNIT RATHER
THAN SEPARATE AND REDUCED THE OVERHAUL FACTOR FOR ENGINES
FROM INSPECT AND REPAIR BY APPROX 8%. NOR SURCHARGE PROFIT
IS $2,039. PROFIT IN PARTS IS ALSO RESULT OF IMPROVED PARTS
MANAGEMENT AS OUTLINED ABOVE FOR ENGINE PRONS.
PRON
M15ED101 M60 MACHINE GUN $1,584
PROFIT IS MAINLY IN PARTS. THE MATERIAL COST OF $921.88 PER
UNIT WAS AN ESTIMATE BASED UPON REPLACEMENT OF RECEIVERS,
WITHOUT ANY HISTORY TO BASE REPLACEMENT AND USAGE OF OTHER
REPAIR PARTS. SIX MONTHS ' OF EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT UNIT
MATERRIAL COSTS SHOULD BE $70 5.54. BASED UPON EXPERIENCE
GAINED THROUGH JAN 85, AN ESTIMATE OF $680.54 WAS SUBMITTED
FOR FY87 FIXED/PRICE. PROFIT OF APPROX $89 IS NOR SURCHARGE.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
COLLECTIONS 3,917 1.8
EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS WITHIN TOLERANCE. SEE CASE
ANALYSIS, PART II, BELOW FOR DETAIL ANALYSIS.
LINE ITEM $ DEVIATION % DEVIATION
DISBURSEMENTS (15,860) (7.4)
EXPLANATION: VARIANCE IS MAINLY DUE TO SHORTFALL IN COSTS,
INVENTORY AND CAPITALIZED EQUIPMENT. COST VARIANCES ARE
DISCUSSED ABOVE. INVENTORY IS $3,406 LESS THAN SEP INITIAL
PLAN AS THE RESULT OF IMPROVED PARTS MANAGEMENT BY PURIFYING
REQUIREMENTS AND CHANGES IN MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD MIX. THE
REMAINING VARIANCE IS THE RESULT OF ACTUAL ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
AND ACCRUED EXPENSES EXCEEDING THE PLAN BY $1,098 AND $2,061
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